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THE LAW OF DEMONSTRATIONS: THE

DEMONSTRATORS, THE POLICE, THE COURTS
By

KERMIT LIPEz*

N JULY 4, 1966, George Ball came to Independence Hall in
Philadelphia to deliver the principal address at an Independence Day rally. His topic was not announced in advance, but, inevitably, he would speak of Viet Nam. George Ball was from the
State Department, and the State Department had us in that war. The
Philadelphia Police Department knew that his visit would be controversial. The peace movement was active in Philadelphia, and the
Department's Civil Disobedience Unit had already been warned by
the Department of Interior, which controls the national shrine, that
there might be trouble. The Unit had also received a letter from
Mr. Eric Weinberger, National Secretary of the Committee for NonViolent Action, informing it that his group would demonstrate at
the time of Ball's visit. Several days prior to the demonstration Mr.
Weinberger visited Police Headquarters.
The story now begins to blur. Mr. Weinberger gives one version of that visit, the police another. They insist that Mr. Weinberger, after informing them that there would be about 1,000 demonstrators, all of whom he represented, agreed that his demonstration
should be confined, at all times, behind barricades on the north side
of Chestnut Street, across from Independence Hall. Mr. Weinberger
concedes the agreement, but he claims the police told him he could
send leafleteers to the south side of Chestnut. At the subsequent
trial of the demonstrators on disorderly conduct charges, the court,
confronted with this conflicting testimony, accepted the story of the
police. We, too, will accept that story, simply because it makes this
case analytically more provocative.
After the meeting with Weinberger, Inspector Meers, the chief
of the Civil Disobedience Unit, Lieutenant Fencl, his principal assistant, and Chief Inspector Selfridge of the Traffic Division, held their
own meeting to map strategy for control of the July 4th demonstration. They decided to place one hundred uniformed policemen on
the scene, along with fifteen men from the Civil Disobedience Unit,
dressed in plain clothes, who would coordinate the control efforts.
Detectives would be placed inside the Independence Hall enclosure,
*1967 Appointee to the Attorney General's Honors Program, Dep't of Justice, Civil
Rights Division; B.A., Haverford, 1963; LL.B., Yale University, 1967.
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the site of the day's formal ceremonies. The officers also decided on
the deployment of barricades, and the issuance of intelligence information on the Committee for Non-Violent Action to the members of
the Civil Disobedience Unit. All these decisions were premised on
the information supplied by Mr. Weinberger and, more fundamentally, on the agreement to keep the demonstration behind the barricades. However, the police also had to consider the likelihood that
other groups, antagonistic to the anti-war demonstrators, would
counter-protest. Legionnaires had already called Inspector Meers,
threatening to do just that. The Inspector had told them to stay
away, but he suspected they would come. Finally, the officers had
to plan for the presence of a group of homosexuals, protesting the
refusal of the Armed Forces to allow them to serve.
On the morning of July 4th the police arrived at Independence
Hall around 9:00 and proceeded to set up their barricades. The
demonstration was to begin at 10:00, the formal ceremonies at 11: 30.
At about 9:30 twenty-five members of the anti-war group arrived.
They immediately went behind the barricades on the north side of
Chestnut Street, held up their signs, and began to march around.
Gradually their numbers swelled. At 10:00 three busloads of demonstrators arrived from New England. The police directed the buses
to Fifth Street, where they had provided for parking, and they then
escorted the demonstrators back to the north side of Chestnut Street,
behind the barricades. Twice, at the request of demonstration leaders,
these barricades were extended along Chestnut Street to accommodate the growing crowd. But at 10:15 some of these leaders approached Inspector Meers and Lt. Fencl, requesting permission to
distribute leaflets on the south side of Chestnut Street in front of
Independence Hall. They apparently also wanted to carry some
signs, but this fact is unclear. Again the police insist that this request was made, the demonstrators deny it. Whatever the truth, the
officers, fearful of a confrontation with hostile groups now congregated on the south side of Chestnut Street, denied the permission.
There were, at this time, several hundred people inside the Independence Hall enclosure, waiting for the formal ceremonies to begin,
and about three hundred people on the sidewalk outside the enclosure, including members of the American Legion and the Veterans
of Foreign Wars. The demonstration leaders, thus balked, returned
to the south side of Chestnut Street, where they conferred with Eric
Weinberger, who still controlled the demonstration. Some of the
leaders wanted to move the whole demonstration across the street,
but Weinberger strenuously resisted this suggestion. He indicated,
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however, that if individuals wanted to distribute leaflets, they should
do so.1

Soon thereafter, Robert Brand, a leader of Students for a Democratic Society, came back across the street, stood in front of Independence Hall, and started to distribute leaflets. Several other
demonstrators followed Brand, some with signs, all with leaflets.
Inspector Meers described this tactic as platooning, suggesting that
the demonstrators would move across the street in small groups until
the entire demonstration had been transferred to the south side of
the street. He and Lt. Fencl were convinced that this was the ultimate intent, and they felt the result would be intolerable. The officers approached Brand, who had now been distributing leaflets for
a short time, and those other demonstrators who had crossed the
street. They reminded them of the agreement with Weinberger, and
asked them to move back across the street. The demonstrators all
replied that they had a right to be where they were; some said they
knew of no agreement.
Precisely what happened next is unclear. Apparently there were
now about ten demonstrators on the south side of Chestnut Street,
leaving about five hundred demonstrators behind the barricades
across the street. Lt. Fend insists that the demonstrators standing
before Independence Hall were now surrounded by hostile groups
that called them names and made threatening moves. Fearing violence, the police again asked the demonstrators, and those surrounding them, to move off. They warned the demonstrators that their
refusal would mean arrest. The hostile crowds dispersed, but the
demonstrators remained, later denying that they had met any hostility. Brand, warned of arrest, sat down on the sidewalk, and was
promptly arrested. More platoons of demonstrators, seeing the arrest,
now crossed the street. Some of these, along with some of the original
ten, also sat down and were arrested. Others who did not sit, but
who continued to distribute leaflets, were also arrested. Later, at
trial, the distinction between those who sat down and those who
simply continued to distribute leaflets will become important. All,
however, were charged with disorderly conduct and convicted at a
summary hearing before the Magistrate.
I.
This demonstration was not unique. Throughout the country,
ever since the Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, there have
been thousands of similar protests, challenging government abuses
on all levels. But the value of this demonstration, for analytic purl Mr.

Weinberger was interviewed on Mar. 9, 1967. He provided this information, as
well as observations on the demonstrations that are discussed later.
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poses, rests in its very typicality.2 Hundreds of people have gathered
in a public open space to protest about a "public issue." 8 Bulk, the
size of the gathering, is a crucial element of that protest, capturing
the attention of a passing public. Without size and organization, the
protest might disintegrate into isolated, unnoticed gestures. It is not
enough, however, merely to capture attention. Once captured, that
attention must be informed. Thus the demonstrators explain their
grievances with signs and leaflets, insuring that the demonstration
does not become a meaningless display.
Place, the site of the demonstration, also contributes to its meaning. The demonstrators, by standing across the street from George
Ball, subjected his speech, no matter how bland, to continuing criticism. Remove them to a distant park, or any neutral setting, and
their protest would seem vainly abstract. Similarly, the demonstration gained impact from the nearness of Independence Hall. As the
literal birthplace of our nation, the shrine has become, over the
years, a potent symbol. Like any symbol, it can be weighted with
many meanings. But to the demonstrators it suggested a purity of
purpose now betrayed by a corrupt government. They emphasized
that betrayal in the leaflet, A Birthday Message to America and
Americans, which they distributed. The charge was blunt:
The United States is in Viet Nam because we have forgotten the
meaning of the Fourth of July. We have made Viet Nam a kind of
colony of our own, and we have over a quarter of a million troops
there today. And like the British in 1776, what we don't understand

today is that most of the Vietnamese, both South and North, don't
want us there. They want to be free, to live in peace, to set up their
own government, organize their own society, make their own mistakes. They want our bases and Navy out, and our troops to go home.
To these demonstrators, given this conviction, the presence of George
Ball at Independence Hall on July 4th was cruelly ironic. Their
demonstration illuminated that irony.
No single motive, however, can be assigned to these demonstrators. Some were there simply to dissent, to declare, out of inner
necessity, their profound hostility to their government's actions.
Caring little for the enlightenment of their fellows, they sought only
to stand publicly apart from their folly. Others, viewing the demonstration as a graphic form of communication, hoped to enlighten.
Perhaps by boldly challenging the easy truths of the conventional
media, they could force some doubt. Perhaps they could confront
George Ball and those after him with a more critical audience.
2This typicality does not extend to the police efforts at control, which are unusual,
and valuable, analytically, for their uniqueness.
3 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 1. Kalven states
that Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), and cases like it, involve "public issue"
picketing. They are distinguished from the labor picketing cases because there is no
picket line, no specific target, and usually no evoking of economic pressures.
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Still others, more aggressive or angry, hoped to stir more than
doubt. This element is elusive. It is tempting to say that some demonstrators wanted trouble, conflict, the central element in direct action.
But direct action, as the following explanation suggests, seems inappropriate for the setting of July 4th:
The emphasis of the direct action groups is to place pressure upon
the power structure by means of positive social dislocation, that is,
by economic, political, and moral leverage. Direct action groups do
engage in negotiation, but their efforts are less an attempt to get an
agreement within the power structure as to how to deal with the
situation, and more toward confronting the whole power structure4
with a conflict situation with which it must somehow come to terms.
This technique contemplates a local power structure, threatened with
paralysis by the obstructive actions of the militant. The national
government cannot be so threatened. But, even when the protest
looks to Washington, the local authorities must deal with its local
manifestation. Official sensitivity, though not directly challenged,
can still be exploited:
Demonstrations are primarily expressions of a point of view, and
do not of themselves change the power structure as vigorously as
non-cooperation or direct intervention might. Nevertheless, they
do go beyond verbal protest and are considered sufficiently threatening by many authorities to provoke harsh reprisals. 5
If these harsh reprisals come, if conflicts with other groups and the
police intensify, forcing impulsive arrests, then the demonstrators
have further dramatized their cause, particularly if their own actions
have been responsible. Publicity will be theirs. They will have exposed the vulnerability, governmental and private, of those who
oppose them. Admittedly, the spectacle of conscious trouble-making
is disturbing. The squeamish will cry anarchy. But there is a nexus
between the effort to persuade and the trouble-making that must not
be overlooked. Persuasion often requires a shock. People do not
easily abandon comfortable assumptions. Thus the demonstrators
must arouse their immediate public if they are to have an impact.
The concern for a too perfect order, free of all conflict, might reduce
demonstrations to futile exercises. There are problems here, of course.
The demonstrators must remain responsible. The conflict they force
must be in response to their positions, and not simply to provocative
conduct. But it would be tragically naive to believe that demonstrations are legitimate only so long as they resemble calm efforts at
persuasion. They are potentially, by their very nature, far more
volatile than that, and any theory of their legitimacy must reckon
with that fact.
However, Eric Weinberger, who organized the July 4th demon4

M. OPPENHEIMER & G. LAKEY,
5 Id. at 73.
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stration, insists that his group, the Commitee for Non-Violent
Action, less militant than other peace groups present that day, does
not usually seek trouble, either from the police or from hostile crowds.
The press, when it covers violence at demonstrations, often focuses
on the antics of thugs, ignoring the responsible conduct of most of
the demonstrators or the object of their protest. Such coverage, he
says, has little value. Also, if there is the prospect of trouble, members of his peace group, despite the strength of their commitment,
will hesitate to come. Thus, in a pamphlet called Discipline for
Peace Demonstrations, endorsed by numerous New York City peace
organizations and distributed to their members, demonstrators are
urged to shun unduly provocative conduct:
A disorderly demonstration is more likely to arouse opposition than
support. Violence on the part of the demonstrators will almost certainly retard, rather than advance, the work of the peace movement.
Demonstrations can be an opportunity to communicate our friendliness and concern for others in and outside of the demonstration and
to begin to express specifically the concept of altruistic love.
Similarly, the demonstrators are urged to cooperate with the police:
In our contact with the police and other officials, we will:
A. Maintain an attitude of understanding for the responsibilities with which they are charged.
B. Be courteous at all times.
C. Be completely open in announcing what we plan to do.
D. Accept all requests which are reasonable.
This emphasis on order and cooperation, however, reflects no
fear of harm or disorder. Weinberger insists that his people do not
cooperate with the police because they want their protection. Though
they know they will often face abuse, they cannot, as pacifists, ask
to be protected by guns. They cooperate simply because the good
will of the police, in their view, often enhances the value of their
demonstrations. However, there will be times when the demonstrators, turning to civil disobedience, seek disorder and sacrifice good
will. Weinberger speaks bluntly. He, and those in his organization,
looking to the philosophy of Thoreau, feel no obligation to obey
laws they regard as unjust. But Weinberger concedes that this philosophy is most apt when, for example, pacifists throw themselves
in front of trucks carrying bombs that will fall in Viet Nam. There
the tie between act and grievance is clear, dramatic. But the philosophy becomes strained when pacifists, bent on direct action, deliberately snarl traffic in Times Square to protest the war. There the tie
becomes almost invisible. Burke Marshall, writing on "The Protest
Movement and the Law," has noted this problem in the civil rights
field:
I know of no systemized analysis of the conditions under which
individuals or groups might be justified in refusing to comply with
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laws that are unrelated to their grievances in order to focus public
attention on the grievances and perhaps bring about a solution of
them through political change. 6

He adds, "It is one thing to protest segregation by breaking the rules
that bring it about .... It is another to adapt the means and methods
of direct action ...to protest against what are complex and deep-

Weinberger recognizes
rooted economic and social problems ....,,7
Marshall's distinction, but he does not share his implied objection.
If pacifists feel their society is functioning smoothly for evil, they
must, on occasion, protest by symbolically withdrawing from that
smooth functioning. Hopefully, the specific object of such protest
will remain visible. Weinberger does not argue that such protest
should be sanctioned by law. He simply feels that it is philosophically defensible. On July 4th, however, civil disobedience, direct
or symbolic, would not, Weinberger emphasized, have furthered the
aims oF his organization. Ball's presence made symbolic gestures
unnecessary, and, since the aim was to stage a large demonstration,
plans for civil disobedience would have kept too many pacifists away.
Going to jail is just no fun.
The police, however, despite the absence of civil disobedience,
still facei a complex situation, demanding the accommodation of
many interests. On one level, there were the interests of several
groups that sought to demonstrate at the same site: the anti-war
people, the homosexuals (though they never came), and the pro-war
people (some of whom arrived in organized groups). Their competing efforts all deserved a hearing. Without the police to mediate,
these efforts might have been wasted in conflict. On another level,
there were the interests of those who cared nothing for demonstrations, but who simply wanted to walk freely into Independence
Square, or drive, unharassed, along Chestnut Street. These were not
unreasonable desires, and the police, sensitive to these prevailing
uses of the streets, could not ignore them. Finally, implied by the
above, but much more vague, looking to people not present, there
is the broad interest of the community in a life free of public disorder. This interest requires no specific representative. It is a sacred
assumption of our social existence. But the threat to this interest
does appear in a specific form - the hostile crowds that surrounded
the demonstrators when they crossed Chestnut Street. Unlike the
pro-war demonstrators who came as an organized group to counterprotest, these hostile crowds, though their anger might be ideological, sought mainly to harass and provoke the demonstrators. Yet
this characterization, perhaps overstated, does not inevitably imply
6 Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 785, 799 (1965).

71d. at 801.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

that these crowds, rather than the demonstrators, must assume responsibility for the threat to community order. Here, at Independence Hall, the police, moving to arrest, assigned that responsibility
to the demonstrators.
These arrests are the troublesome fact, forcing, by their finality,
by their control of the future, a speculative probe of the larger issues
they imply. These arrests issued from a demonstration, protesting
against the war in Viet Nam, that perpetuates a long and honored
tradition of protest in this country. Our society long ago decided
that government, at all levels, must be exposed to these attacks. But
this right to dissent will become hollow if it is confined to the conventional media of communication. The impulse for protest often
rises in those who cannot afford these media, or who, because of
long deprivation, cannot frame the eloquent arguments they assume.
If the protest is extreme, or the objects attacked sacred, radio, television, and the newspapers may simply shun all involvement. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, these demonstrations may far surpass
these media in their impact. They confront people with a spectacle
of commitment that cannot easily be dismissed.
But the peculiar values of these demonstrations, their availability to the alien, their immediacy, suggest their potential for
trouble. They inevitably become sources of disorder, demanding
police involvement. Here the police, to all appearance, acted responsibly. Yet their conduct raises grave questions about their role.
They acted to terminate a demonstration independently of any formal
licensing system. Only their judgment informed their discretion, a
troubling fact for those who instinctively distrust the police. Yet the
move to terminate came only after rigorous efforts to regulate the
demonstration, first through the pre-demonstration agreement, then
through the orders to return to the agreed areas. Perhaps these
limited area regulations, designed to accommodate conflicting interests, should be sanctioned as a valuable technique of control. However, these restrictions were, in part, conditioned by the presence of
hostile, or potentially hostile, crowds. Perhaps it seems anomalous
to allow the presence of such crowds to restrict the movement of the
demonstrators. The police, arguably, should have moved against
that crowd. There are, of course, no easy answers, but the police,
at least in Philadelphia, despite all these uncertainties, do approach
these demonstrations with unusual skill and assurance.
II.
The Civil Disobedience Unit was created in February of 1964
by former Philadelphia Police Commissioner Howard Leary. Civil
rights demonstrations, occurring with increasing frequency, had ex-
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hausted the existing technique of control - summoning together,
at word of a demonstration, available members of other units, such
as detective or traffic, and ordering this potpourri of talent to function as an organized unit.' Often this unit, undermanned and inexperienced, could not do its job, and the other units, forced to
provide men, were seriously handicapped. The Civil Disobedience
Unit, composed of a lieutenant, a sergeant, four policewomen and
eighteen policemen, would provide a stable reservoir of demonstration specialists, carefully selected and schooled.
The present Unit has no member with less than ten years of
experience on the force. All were selected with this ideal officer
in mind:
1. He is a seasoned, experienced policeman. He has walked the

beat, patrolled in a prowl car, found lost children and settled
family arguments. .

. In other words he's a good cop -

like

rare wine - aged by years of activity.
2.

He is a self-disciplined enforcer of the law. He controls his

temper at all times, resisting the taunts, slurs, and insults designed to make him blow his top. .

.

. He performs his tasks

with cool, methodical, lawful skill, secure in knowing his selfdiscipline is stronger than the discipline of the "ism" groups
he faces. He frustrates them in their efforts to shout "police
brutality" to cover up their own lack of self-control.
3.

He is coolly courageous under fire. He expects bad days when
rough tactics are used .... Standing unflinchingly before menac-

ing and undisciplined bands of way-out citizens, who espouse
numerous borderline causes, he represents the courageous thin
blue line between order and anarchy.
4. He is unprejudiced with a firm belief in the equality of man.

To him, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution are not just
words on a paper, but a way of life...
... Unprejudiced, unbiased, unbigoted, he acts as an ethical
example to others on the picket line, at the rally, or in the
meeting.
5. He is intelligent, verbal, poised, and courteous. His keen mind

produces intelligent well- placed words to the dissident groups or
leaders that may avert violence and arrests. His warm personality
enables him to develop informants, inspire trust and maintain
cooperation and order under tense circumstances. 9
It is easy to smile at this hopeful elaboration of the CD man. The
author concedes that "some administrators may feel the combination
of these traits and skills can only be found in superman," but he
argues that "a close look at a police department of any size will
reveal 'gems' waiting to be polished and placed in the CD setting."'"
8 Most of the information on the Civil Disobedience Unit was obtained from a lengthy
interview with Captain Michael Rotman, the present head of the CDU, and Lt. George
Fend, his principal assistant, and the most experienced demonstration officer in the
city.
9 Fox, The CD Man, THE POLICE CHIEF, Nov. 1966, at 20, 24-25. (The author, Harry
G. Fox, is Chief Inspector, Philadelphia Police Dep't.)
0
Id. at 25.
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Perhaps. But the more important point, distinct from the reality of
these standards, is the emphasis they reflect. Harsh, impulsive enforcement must be avoided; there must be no hint of discriminatory
or vindictive policing. Thus all CD men receive a week of lectures
from Dr. Charlotte Epstein, a sociologist at the Albert Greenfield
Institute on Human Relations. She teaches them, in the words of
Lt. Fencl, "how not to be prejudiced." Curiously, this training in
attitude control is not accompanied by any training in crowd control.
Such skill, at least in part, is assumed.
However, the indifference toward crowd control training can
also be explained by an essential tactic of the Civil Disobedience
Unit - the emphasis, evident in the July 4th demonstration, on predemonstration preparations. Lt. Fencl, as the principal strategist of
the CDU, has worked hard to establish good relations with leaders
of the most active demonstrating groups in Philadelphia. These
leaders, at least 90 percent of the time, either by telephone, letter,
or more informal contact on the street, will notify the CDU of the
time, site, and scope of a demonstration. This arrangement helps
the CDU to devise an effective control plan, and it assures the
demonstrators of adequate protection. Indeed, Lt. Fencl feels that
the police are so frequently given advance warning because the
demonstrators recognize their need for police protection. However,
the CDU does not rely completely on this cooperation. Its members
will often attend meetings of these groups, hoping to get news of
demonstration plans, and, equally important, hoping to understand
the composition and strategy of these groups. These intelligence
efforts also involve the collection and distribution to the Unit of the
literature of the demonstrators. Effectively compiled and absorbed,
this information can make control at the scene much easier:
At the scene of the demonstration, the skilled CD officer will
quickly identify the leaders. He'll be able to point out the various
combinations of organizations represented. Knowing the picket
captains, groups and demonstrators, he anticipates their moves and
can advise the ranking officer whether to expect violence, vandalism,
arrests and prosecutions, or non-violence that will be orderly and
lawful."

Unfortunately, however, familiarity with the aims and techniques of the demonstrating groups will not eliminate much of the
uncertainty from the demonstration site. The demonstrators themselves do not follow iron rules. And, almost always, they will confront a hostile crowd that follows no rules. Lt. Fend is convinced
that these crowds often pose real threats of violence. Occasionally,
the threat bears no relation to any position that the demonstrators
espouse. The mere presence of a crowd can be incendiary, particu11Id. at 22.
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larly to those who are inconvenienced; there are always thugs around
who will attack anything. Lt. Fend vividly remembers an incident
where one pro-war group harassed another, having assumed that
any group demonstrating on the streets must be against the war.
But the majority of the attacks do have some ideological content,
however crude, and the police view this kind of hostile crowd with
a curious ambivalence. They begin, in this statement of Captain
Rotman's, by granting the hostile crowd a limited constitutional right:
"We are [referring to the CDUJ referees between the constitutional
right of the demonstrators to assemble and the right of the hostile
crowd to speak against them." This statement, of course, says nothing
about the hostile crowd that moves from invective to violence. Such
a crowd, presumably, would lose all claims to protection. But the
statement does suggest a neutrality between opposing rights which,
in the situation that threatens to become violent, is probably illusory.
The police simply do not like these demonstrators.
Chief Inspector Fox, while detailing his ideal CDU man, refers
to "the -ism groups," these "undisciplined bands of way-out citizens
who espouse numerous borderline causes." He insists, of course, that
their rights must be protected. Similarly, Lt. Fend, in response to a
question about the hostile crowd, asked his own question: "If you
have a hostile crowd of one hundred, and two speakers, what's the
easiest thing to do? You stop the two." Lt. Fencl, however, did not
like this response and, erasing a smile, quickly added that, in reality,
you would first try to control the crowd. Both Chief Inspector Fox
and Lt. Fencl are fully aware of the paper rights of these demonstrators. Both recognize that denial of these rights, no matter how
minimal, produces claims of police brutality and bad publicity. But,
in their guts, like most policemen, they regard these demonstrators
as foolish, potentially dangerous, nuisances. In a tense situation,
where the police must assign responsibility for threatened violence,
that fundamental aversion can control judgment.
The architects of the CDU, knowing this danger, try to avoid
the crisis situation - thus the emphasis on pre-demonstration intelligence and planning. This emphasis is particularly apparent in their
approach to traffic problems. If the officers fear that a demonstration, announced in advance, might disrupt motor traffic, they do not
hesitate to re-route traffic around the area or set up no parking
zones. If they have had no warning, they may be more reluctant to
unsettle traffic patterns, but, if the demonstration cannot be confined
to sidewalks, they may move against the traffic. Generalizations, the
officers insist, are impossible. However, they do not feel that traffic
must necessarily prevail in the streets. The demonstrators also have
compelling claims to their use.
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If all these preparations fail, however, and a crisis develops,
then the CDU, aware of its inevitable predilections, confronts the
danger it fears most: the possibility of clumsy, impulsive arrests,
with the concomitant bad publicity. Chief Inspector Fox states the
danger well:
The average policeman doesn't enjoy guarding a picket line or
protecting and preventing demonstrators from being attacked. It
usually means long, hot, boring hours in one spot. Couple this with
endless chants, attempts to bait him by pretending to sit down or
block traffic, then add goading remarks, many of which are obscene,
and you have produced irritated and anxious police officers.
Such a situation may result in an increased desire to make quick
and forceful arrests, or to answer with threats and retaliatory obscenities on the part of the officers.
If this occurs, a hue and cry goes up from the ranks of the civil
rights groups with charges of "police brutality," "verbal brutality,"
"police threats," and "unfit to be law officers" hurled at the police
department. Demands are made on the Mayor and Police Commissioner to punish the culprit policemen.
The civil rights demonstrators often enlist the aid of the news
media, usually giving "academy award" performances, with the

grimaces and groans of a horror movie. They rush to appeal to the
Police Review Board, the Police Discipline Board,
the FBI and the
courts, charging illegal arrests by bigot cops. 12
Here, again, the distrust and dislike of the demonstrators are clear.
Their principal aim, the feeling goes, is to embarrass the police.
That aim must be thwarted. On a mimeographed sheet entitled
Procedure for Civil Disobedience Teams, distributed to all members
of the Unit, there appears, in bold letters, this instruction:
AVOID PICAYUNE ARRESTS
a. Arrest is the successful climax of any protest demonstration and
can be interpreted as a denial of the right to demonstrate; therefore, be discreet in avoiding arrest for intoxication or Minor
Breach of the Peace.
b. Have the group leaders or coordinators remove any visibly intoxicated persons or undesirables from the picket line. \When
this can only be accomplished by an arrest, be tactful in executing
the arrest.

The arrest procedure is broken down into several stages, all
designed to insure tact. If the demonstration occurs on a highway
or street, and the law is violated, the arresting officer, addressing
himself to the demonstrator, must first announce: "You are interfering with the free movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic please move." After waiting a few seconds for responsive action, he
again asks, "Will you move?" If there is a refusal or non-compliance, he informs the demonstrator of his offense: "Your action
prohibits the safe and peaceful movement of persons and vehicles
12 Id. at 24.
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in the public streets and prevents access to the buildings. This is a
violation of Section 406 of the Pennsylvania Penal Code entitled
Disorderly Conduct." He again asks the demonstrator if he will
move. If, again, there is refusal or non-compliance, he states: "You
are now under arrest and charged with Disorderly Conduct. Will
you walk to the Emergency Patrol Wagon?" If the demonstrator
refuses, he asks, "Do you insist on being carried to the Emergency
Patrol Wagon or will you walk?" After waiting a few seconds for
a reaction, he states: "I wish to advise you that you will be in violation of Section 314 of the Pennsylvania Penal Code if we carry you
to the Patrol Wagon and the additional charge of resisting arrest
will be placed." Thus ends the drama.
If the demonstration occurs in a building, hallway, or office,
the routine is similar except for the explanation of the charge, which
looks to the peculiar function of the building or office: "You are
interfering with the normal business operation of this (office, building, hallway). Please move." Arrests, in fact, are few. From January to September, 1966, a period during which there were 271
demonstrations in Philadelphia, there were only 53 arrests.'" Most
of these occurred on July 4th at Independence Hall.
The police were not happy about these July 4th arrests. They
were highly publicized, and those CDU men who made the arrests
would now have to spend long hours in court telling their story.
They would face searching cross-examination, often fierce, and they
would not be surprised if, after all their efforts, the convictions were
thrown out. They did not doubt, from their own perspective, the
rightness of their actions. But the Supreme Court of the United
States, increasingly involved in the problems created by demonstrations, had been reversing convictions in this area. Lt. Fend knew
these decisions well, and he was troubled by their preoccupation with
Southern law enforcement. But now, in the Adderley v. Florida4
case, he saw a glimmer of hope, though he was not sure just what
the decision meant.
III.
The seminal case on the law of demonstrations, as announced
by the Supreme Court, is Cantwell v. Connecticut,'" which involved
no demonstration. Cantwell and his two sons, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, as part of an effort to obtain contributions for their
cause, stopped two men on a New Haven street, asked, and received
13Fifty of these arrests were for disorderly conduct and breach of the peace. Three

were for illegal possession of explosives. Letter from Captain Michael Rotman to
author, Dec. 9, 1966.

14 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

15310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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permission to play a phonograph record called "Enemies." The record
attacked Catholicism, the religion of the two men, and they quickly
became incensed, threatening to strike Cantwell if he did not leave.

He left. Subsequently, he was charged with the common law offense
of inciting others to breach of the peace. There apparently was no
evidence that he had been personally offensive. Only his message
aroused.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, relying heavily on
Cantwell's use of a public street and his controlled conduct:
Cantwell ... was upon a public street, where he had a right to be,

and where he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.
There is no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive .... It is plain that he wished only to interest
them in his propaganda. The sound of the phonograph is not shown
to have disturbed residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd,
or to have impeded traffic. Thus far he had invaded no right or
interest of the public or of the men accosted. 1 6

This analysis embodies three themes that will persist throughout this
area: (1) the street as a legitimate forum for the peaceful expression
of ideas; (2) the need to subordinate this use to the primary uses
of the streets, such as traffic; and (3) concern with the conduct of
those who use the streets to promote their causes. However, this
latter concern was no' directly responsive to the conviction before
the Court. Cantwell himself had not breached the peace. He was
convicted of inciting such a breach in others. The Court conceded
that such an offense existed, but only in the narrowest circumstances:
One may . . .be guilty of [breach of the peace] . . .if he commit
acts or make statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance
of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in
practically all, the provocative language which was held to amount
to a breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive
remarks directed to the person of the hearer....
[Here) we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to
buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell,
however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true
17
religion.

In effect, the Court, confronted with a conviction under a breach of
peace statute, has carefully circumscribed the legitimacy of convictions based on hostile crowds, though, in fact, it deals only with a
situation where one man faces another. Cantwell, involved in a
peaceful effort at persuasion, cannot be blamed for the violent
reaction of his listener. His speech, if it is to be punished, must have
forced the provocation: "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not
in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safe16

1d. at 308.

"7Id. at 309-10.
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guarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument."
If the Court's analysis had rested here, one could conclude that
Cantwell's conduct could not, under any circumstances, be punished
by the State. But the Court refuses to go that far. The State could
have passed a statute reflecting its judgment
that street discussion of religious affairs, because of its tendency to
provoke disorders, should be regulated. . . . Such a declaration of
the State's policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law
as infringing constitutional limitations.ls

Because the State has not passed such a statute, the Court, looking
to the facts of the case before it, must decide if "the petitioner's communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees,
raised [such a] clear and present menace to public peace and order
as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in
question."' 9 The Court concluded that it did not. But, by introducing the clear and present danger test, the Court suggests that Cantwell's peaceful conduct, wholly persuasive in intent, could, under
certain compelling circumstances, be terminated. The Court's apparent effort to protect the responsible speaker from the irresponsibility
of his audience was just that, appearance. Inevitably, the clear and
present danger test will draw much of its content from that audience.
Also, the Court has withdrawn from its strong statement that a man
has the right to use the streets to impart his views peacefully. If the
State decides that such a use constitutes a clear and present danger
to a substantial interest, it can regulate that use. These affirmations
and withdrawals shroud Cantwell in ambiguity, a troubling feature
for a seminal case.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ° also involved a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and a face-to-face encounter on the street.
Chaplinsky was distributing religious literature on the streets of
Rochester when a disturbance occurred at a busy intersection. A
traffic officer started with Chaplinsky for the police station. On the
way they encountered a Marshal Bowering, who was hurrying to the
scene of the disturbance. The Marshal repeated an earlier warning
he had given to Chaplinsky, who replied with some harsh words:
"You are a God damned racketeer and a damned fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are fascists or agents of fascists."
These words formed the substance of the complaint under the following statute:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying words
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public
18

Id. at 307.

19Id. at 311.
20315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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place, nor call him by an offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to
or to prevent him from pursuing his
deride, offend or annoy him, 21
lawful business or occupation.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire read this statute narrowly,
confining its application to those words that "have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed."2 2 Such words were to be defined in terms of
"what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.' '23 The United
States Supreme Court, accepting this construction, affirmed Chaplinsky's conviction:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed24 by the social
interest in order and morality. [Footnotes omitted.]
This statement elaborates a widely-accepted theory of the First
Amendment - there are certain forms of speech, lacking any social
value, irrelevant to any effort to persuade, that are outside the scope
of constitutional guarantees. The validity of that theory can be
disputed. For our purposes, in the context of Chaplinsky, its importance rests with its emphasis on words that can result only in
provocation. Chaplinsky, using such words, was exclusively engaged
in the personal abuse the Court did not find in Cantwell where, ultimately, the conduct had to be described as an effort to persuade.
Chaplinsky, of course, would be a much more difficult case if the
abusive words were tied to the kind of appeal found in Cantwell. Its
rationale, framed in terms of verbal act, is valid only so long as these
abusive words are the sole content of the speech. But Chaplinsky,
though its rationale is limited, provides an effective counterpoint to
Cantwell. Cantwell, the petitioner, whatever his folly, was involved
in an appeal to reason. He provoked the breach of peace only because his listener disliked his views. Chaplinsky was involved in no
such appeal. He provoked the possibility of breach because men will
not tolerate personal abuse. Cantwell cannot justly bear the responsibility for disorder. Chaplinsky must bear it. This distinction, of
course, is not fast. The clear and present danger test, applied in the
21

22

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570.2 (1955).

State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (1941).
at 320, 18 A.2d at 762.

23 Id.
24

315 U.S. at 571-72.
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Cantwell situation, could completely obliterate it. But the distinction
does suggest a mode of analysis that should become important when
Cantwell and Chaplinsky become a mass of protesters in a public
open space. Those cases will also involve breach of peace convictions. They should also involve a conscientious effort to justly place
the responsibility for that breach.
In Terminiello v. Chicago2 5 Mr. Justice Douglas concerned himself with precisely this problem. Terminiello was found guilty of
disorderly conduct because of a speech he delivered in a Chicago
auditorium to the Christian Veterans of America. The auditorium
was filled to capacity, and outside a crowd of about one thousand
persons gathered to protest the meeting. A cordon of policemen
attempted to maintain order, but they were not able to prevent several disturbances. Terminiello, in his speech, condemned the conduct
of this crowd, and also criticized a variety of political and racial
groups. The state, focusing on this speech, tried to bring it within
the rationale of Chaplinsky, arguing that it was composed of derisive,
fighting words which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional
guarantees. But Mr. Justice Douglas never reached that troublesome
issue. The trial court had charged the jury that it could find a breach
of the peace if the defendant's conduct "stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace
and quiet by arousing alarm." 2 6 Mr. Justice Douglas objected to
the charge:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. . . . That is why freedom

of speech, though not absolute,

. .

.is nevertheless protected against

censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear

and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest ...
The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded
this province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech
stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds
27
may not stand.

These are justly famous words, elaborating the First Amendment in the dynamic sense that alone is meaningful. If the clear and
present danger test must be used, and Justice Douglas does not
abandon it, it must be used only in relation to an evil of grave proportions. Problems of local disorder may or may not assume such
25337 U.S. 1 (1949).
2Id.

at 3.

271d. at 4-5.
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proportions. Until they do, "the appropriate response of the community . . . should lie in affording [the speakers] adequate police
protection.'"'2 Certainly this is the logic of Justice Douglas' position.
Terminiello, like Cantwell, could not be charged with the disorder
of those who opposed him.
Justice Jackson, in a long dissent, bitterly attacks the refusal of
the majority to confront the actual circumstances of the case. That
evasion, he argues, allied with the majority's abstractions, invites
disaster:
Terminiello's victory today certainly fulfills the most extravagant
hopes of both right and left totalitarian groups, who want nothing
so much as to paralyze and discredit the only democratic
authority
29
that can curb them in their battle for the streets.

This smacks of hysteria, justified, perhaps, by Justice Jackson's recent
experiences in Europe. Fortunately, the extravagant fears do not
becloud his analysis. He states unequivocally his position that the
actions of a hostile crowd can control the application of the clear
and present danger test:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and

present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
[rioting] that Congress (or the State or city) has a right to prevent."
...In this case the evidence proves beyond dispute that danger of
rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear, present and
immediate.8 0

That evidence, as reviewed by Jackson, includes threats directed at
the speaker. It also includes "epithets . . . which Terminiello hurled
at an already inflamed mob of his adversaries, ' '3 much, suggests
Jackson, in the manner of Chaplinsky. But this analysis is troubling.
Chaplinsky uttered nothing but epithets. Terminiello delivered a
long, rambling speech, much of it scurrilous and incendiary, but a
speech nevertheless, one that presented a point of view. Jackson,
dwelling on the incendiary, would summarize it as a prolonged
provocation to riot, both to those sympathetic to the point of view
and those opposed. If, in fact, Terminiello was urging a riot, then
the case would be easy. The First Amendment does not protect purposeful incitement to riot. But Terminiello's speech was more complex than that, and the complexity demands caution. Jackson, outraged, would abandon caution, silencing Terminiello because, in
23Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72

YALE

L.J. 877, 932

(1963).
Professor Emerson, however, does not approve of the clear and present danger
test. If the problems become too extreme even for police protection, "the u!t;mate
recourse of the community is in martial law."
2 337 U.S. at 25 (dissenting opinion).
30 Id. at 26.
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effect, he asked for trouble and he got it. This proposition becomes
even more startling when one remembers that Terminiello was speaking inside a hall, and that, as Chief Justice Vinson points out in his
dissent, most of the trouble was caused by people outside the hall
who did not even hear the speech.3 2 Censorship by a hostile crowd
could not be more blatant.
Jackson, of course, recognizes the dangers of his position. Ie
warns that "courts must beware lest they become mere organs of
popular intolerance. ' 33 But he feels that his Court, forced to review
the actions of local authorities, must defer to the judgment of those
authorities who alone could make free speech a meaningful right:
[I]f free speech is to be a practical reality, affirmative and imTerminiello's theoretical right to
mediate protection is required ....
speak free from interference would have no reality if Chicago should
withdraw its officers to some other section of the city, or if the men
assigned to the task should look the other way when the crowd
threatens Terminiello. Can society be expected to keep these men
at Terminiello's service if it has nothing to say of his behavior which
may force them into dangerous action ?4

This statement presents disarming logic. But, carefully considered,
that logic is pernicious, for it suggests that the more intensely a
speaker is pressed by a hostile crowd, the more tightly he can be
controlled by the police, even to the point of silence. Jackson apparently feels that an ordered society, at this moment in time, must
adopt this position:
As a people grow in capacity for civilization and liberty their tolerance will grow, and they will endure, if not welcome, discussion

even on topics as to which they are committed. ... But on our way
to this idealistic
state of tolerance the police have to deal with men
35
as they are.
Again the statement, with its sad resignation, is disarming. But this
resignation reveals a fundamental misapprehension of the import
of the First Amendment, which commands an assumption precisely
contrary to that which Jackson advocates. We must assume that we
are in the idealistic state of tolerance, and that, when tolerance fails
and crowds grow hostile, the officials must move against that aberration. Only thus can we maximize the value choice that has already
been made for us in the First Amendment.
First principles, unfortunately, are easily forgotten. In Feiner
v. New York 6 the Court sustained the breach of peace conviction
of a man who had been addressing an open-air meeting of about 75
or 80 people in Syracuse, urging them to attend a meeting scheduled
U.S. at 8 (dissenting opinion).
337 U.S. at 33 (dissenting opinion).
34d. at 31-32.
35id. at 33.
36340 U.S. 315 (1951).
32337
33
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for a Syracuse hotel that night. But Feiner also made derogatory
remarks about President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor
of Syracuse, and other local political officials. The police further
testified that, speaking before a mixed audience, he gave the impression that he was trying to arouse the Negro people against the
whites, urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.
Such statements created excitement, and several onlookers made remarks to the police about their inability to handle the crowd. At
least one member of the crowd threatened violence if the police did
not act. Other members apparently favored Feiner's speech. Fearing
that members of the crowd would turn against each other, the police
asked Feiner to stop speaking. He refused. Again he was asked
and again he refused. The crowd began to press closer around Feiner
and an officer. Finally, having asked Feiner to stop talking three
times over a space of four or five minutes, the officer told Feiner he
was under arrest. He ordered him down from his box and then
reached up to grab him.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, approves of the
police performance:
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument
for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that,
when as here, the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement
to riot, they are powerless to prevent
37
a breach of the peace.
This statement, as Black argues in dissent, may not accurately portray the facts in the Feiner case, but, doctrinally, it seems impeccable.
Chaplinsky is the precursor. Both cases would stand for the narrow
proposition that speech, unrelated to any exposition of ideas, designed only to stir violence, can be silenced by the police. Admittedly,
as we saw in Terminiello, it would be a rare speech that was unrelated to any exposition of ideas. Thus, and rightly so, the just
grounds for silencing would be equally rare. But Feiner cannot be
confined to this narrow proposition. Vinson, adopting Jackson's
approach, further emphasizes that there were people in the crowd
who obviously disliked Feiner's speech and who threatened violence
if he were not stopped. This analysis undermines the incitement to
riot ground, dwelling upon violence directed against the speaker,
rather than on violence that he urges his audience to initiate. Vinson
then drives the point home: "Petitioner was thus neither arrested nor
convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it was
the reaction which it actually engendered."8 8 This is sophistry, urging a distinction that is completely illusory. The content of the speech
forces the reaction. If that content has any claims to constitutional
37

1d. at 321.
at 319-20.
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protection, if it is not simply incitement to riot, then the reaction of
a hostile crowd cannot, under a proper view, deprive it of those claims.
Justice Black, dissenting, takes this view. Though he quarrels
with the majority's deference to the findings of the trial court, arguing for an independent review of the facts, he is willing to accept
their summary of the situation:
Even accepting every "finding of fact" below, I think this conviction makes a mockery of the free speech guarantees of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. The end result of the affirmance here is
to approve a simple and readily available technique by which cities
and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and censorship of
39

the local police.
Black fully recognizes the implications of his position. He is demanding that the police, even in the critical situation found in
Feiner,make affirmative efforts to protect the speaker:
I reject the implication of the Court's opinion that the police had
no obligation to protect petitioner's constitutional right to talk.
The police of course have power to prevent breaches of the peace.

But if, in the name of preserving order, they ever can interfere with
a lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts
to protect him. Here the policemen did not even pretend to try to
protect petitioner. . . . [TJhe crowd was restless but there is no

showing of any attempt to quiet it; pedestrians were forced to walk
into the street, but there was no effort to clear a path on the sidewalk; one person threatened to assault petitioner but the officers did
nothing to discourage this when even a word might have sufficed.
Their duty was to protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere. Instead, they
40
shirked that duty and acted only to suppress the right to speak.

Black's lengthy analysis of the duties of the police illuminates
a unique element in the Feiner case - the crowd of people gathered
for a meeting on a public street. In Cantwell and Chaplinsky only
one man addressed another on the street. In Terminiello the meeting
was held in a public auditorium. But Feiner asked people to congregate on a street corner, and, if they had not responded, his effort
would have been meaningless. Black recognizes that the public
assembly creates special problems, but he is untroubled by them. If
pedestrians were blocked or forced into the street, the police should
have cleared a path for them. Their inconvenience would not justify
termination of the speech. The point is intriguing, particularly because Black will later become terribly troubled by the threats to
community order of demonstrations held in public settings. There
he will focus sharply on the disruptions caused by these public assemblages, arguing that such gatherings are more than speech, and thus
susceptible to greater regulation. But, on any realistic view, the
39 Id. at 323 (dissenting opinion).
40 id. at 326-27.
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allegedly pure speech situation found in Feiner, involving, inevitably,
the large public crowd, poses precisely the same control problems as
these later cases. This fact should warn us that, as we move into the
demonstration cases, free speech analysis may be far off point.
Edwards v. South Carolina4 is the first demonstration case. One
hundred and eighty-seven Negro students walked in small groups
of fifteen to the South Carolina State House grounds, an area of
two city blocks open to the general public. The students, entering
the grounds through a driveway and parking area, were told by the
law enforcement officials that they had a right, as citizens, to go
through the State House grounds, as long as they were peaceful.
During the next half hour or 45 minutes, the students, in the same
small groups, walked single file or two abreast in an orderly way
through the grounds, each group carrying placards that stated: "I am
proud to be a Negro" and "Down with segregation." During this
time a crowd of 200 to 300 onlookers had collected in the horseshoe
area (the parking area) and on the adjacent sidewalks. Wary of
this crowd, the police authorities advised the students that they would
be arrested if they did not disperse within fifteen minutes. Instead
of dispersing, the petitioners engaged in what the City Manager described as "boisterous," "loud," and "flamboyant" conduct, which,
as his later testimony made clear, consisted of listening to a "religious
harangue" by one of their leaders, and loudly singing "The Star
Spangled Banner" and other patriotic and religious songs, while
stamping their feet and clapping their hands. After fifteen minutes
had passed, the police arrested the students and marched them off
to jail.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, begins with a broad
stroke: "[I]t is clear to us that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this record,
South Carolina infringed the petitioners' constitutionally protected
rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for
redress of their grievances.''42 He adds that
the circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form. The petitioners felt aggrieved by laws of South Carolina which allegedly
"prohibited Negro privileges in this State." They peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government and there peaceably
expressed their grievances "to the citizens of South
Carolina, along
'
with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina. '43
Justice Stewart has linked together rights of speech, assembly, and
petition. He suggests that this case involves all in their pristine and
41372 U.S. 229 (1963).
4Id. at 235.
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classic form. But, abandoning all analysis of free assembly and
freedom to petition, he proceeds to analyze the case in the free speech
terms of Feiner and Chaplinsky, arguing that here no speaker passed
the bounds of argument or persuasion and incited to riot, or challenged with any "fighting words." Under this analysis, the demonstration simply becomes a massive effort at non-verbal communication. Stewart continues in this vein, turning next to Cantwell and
its warning that a broadly defined breach of peace offense must not
be used to punish the exercise of free speech. Finally, he turns to
Teriie/lo: "[T]he courts of South Carolina have defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if their
speech 'stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of these
grounds may not stand.' "4 Again, the words are stirring, but they
are not appropriate. The demonstrators, unlike Cantwell, Chaplinsky,
Feiner, and Terminiello, were not simply making a speech. Justice
Stewart recognized this fact when, at the outset of the opinion, he
referred to free assembly and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances. But, as he moved through his opinion, Justice Stewart
never fulfilled the promise of this recognition.
In Cox v. Louisiana4" that promise remains unfulfilled. Two
thousand Negro students from Southern University in Baton Rouge,
determined to protest the arrests of fellow students who had picketed
stores that maintained segregated lunch counters, assembled across
the street from the courthouse. Under the direction of Reverend Cox,
the students lined up about five deep along the length of the block.
Several of them carried signs similar to those which had been used
the day before. The messages were terse: "Don't buy discrimination
for Christmas" and "Sacrifice for Christ, don't buy." Certain stores
that segregated were proclaimed unfair. The students then sang
"God Bless America," pledged allegiance to the flag, prayed briefly,
and sang one or two hymns, including "We Shall Overcome." The
students who were locked in jail cells in the courthouse building
responded with their own singing. The demonstrators, in turn, responded with cheers and applause. Cox then made a speech urging
the students to sit-in at the downtown lunch counters that had refused to serve Negroes, but he warned them against any violence.
At this point a sheriff, over a loud speaker, announced that the
demonstration now had to be broken up, that it had become inflammatory, a direct violation of the law, a disturbance of the peace.
Cox and his demonstrators did not move. Several sheriff's deputies
then moved across the street and put their hands on some of the
at 238.
379 U.S. 536 (1965).

4Id.
45

522

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

students. A tear gas shell exploded. The demonstrators quickly
dispersed. Cox was arrested the next day, and subsequently convicted of three offenses: disturbing the peace, obstructing public
passages, and picketing before a courthouse.
The breach of peace conviction falls first on two grounds:
"We hold that Louisiana may not constitutionally punish appellant under this statute for engaging in the type of conduct which
this record reveals, and also that the statute as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court is unconstitutionally broad in
scope. ' 40 But Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, dwells
principally on the first ground, subjecting the record to intense
scrutiny. The singing, though loud, was not disorderly. There is no
indication that the mood of the students was ever hostile, aggressive,
or unfriendly, a conclusion supported by a film of the demonstration.
Any fear of violence "seems to have been based upon the reaction of
the group of white citizens looking on from across the street."4 This
being so, "the compelling answer ...is that constitutional rights may
not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise." 4 8 With respect to the statute itself, Justice Goldberg notes
that, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, this statute
"is at least as likely to allow conviction for innocent speech as was
the charge of the trial judge in Terminiello."49 Thus the statute is
unconstitutional on its face.
There is nothing remarkable in any of these pronouncements.
All were augured by Terminiello or Edwards. But Cox was also
convicted, under a narrowly drawn statute,50 of obstructing public
passages, and there was no doubt from the record that the sidewalk
across from the courthouse was obstructed. Such obstruction had,
46

Id. at 545. The statute reads:

Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby . . . crowds or congregates with others ... in or upon ... a public street or public highway, or
upon a public sidewalk, or any other public place or building, . . and who
fails or refuses to disperse and move on, . . .when ordered so to do by any
law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in which such act or acts
are committed, or by any law enforcement officer of the state of Louisiana, or
any other authorized person, . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.
LA. REV. STAT. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1962).
47 379 U.S. at 550.
48
1d. at 551.
9
4 Id. at 552.
0
No person shall willfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any
public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other passageway, or
the entrance, corridor or passage of any public building, structure, watercraft
or ferry, by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or
passage thereon or therein.
Providing, however, nothing herein contained shall apply to a bona fide
legitimate labor organization or to any of its legal activities such as picketing,
lawful assembly or concerted activity in the interest of its members for the
purpose of accomplishing or securing more favorable wage standards, hours of
employment and working conditions.
LA. REv. STAT. § 14:100.1 (Supp. 1962).
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of course, appeared in other cases, such as Feiner and Edwards, but
there it was always thrown in as an element in the vague breach of
peace charge. Justice Roberts, however, as early as Cantwell, had
suggested that the exercise of First Amendment rights in the public
setting must not impede the movement of traffic." Now the State
of Louisiana had embodied that view in a statute, insisting on its
application to public assemblies which did not have as their specific
purpose the obstruction of traffic. On its face, the statute precluded
all street assemblies and parades, forcing a clear confrontation between the right of the state to forbid all access to streets and other
public facilities for parades and demonstrations, and the right of the
people to use those streets and facilities for public assemblies. The
Court, however, avoided this delicate issue. Goldberg and four of
his colleagues found evidence from oral argument and from the
record that, in practice, the statute was administered by an informal
permit system. Because this system rested on the unbridled discretion
of local officials, it was, under a long line of First Amendment cases,
unconstitutional.
Justice Black, however, did not evade. Though he found the
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, because of its
explicit exception for picketing and assembly by labor unions, he
stated unequivocally that "I have no doubt about the general power
of Louisiana to bar all picketing on its streets and highways. "52 This
large concession to state power issues from Justice Black's familiar
speech-conduct distinction: "Standing, patrolling, or marching back
and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be
regulated or prohibited." 5 Justice Goldberg, though he does not
indicate concurrence in the blanket prohibition, echoes this analysis:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom
to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling,
marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amend54
ments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.

This is faulty analysis, sharing, with Stewart in Edwards, the
misconception that a demonstration is nothing more than a nonverbal attempt at communication. In reality, this non-verbal communication, this conduct, is the public assembly accorded special
51 310 U.S. at 304.
52 379 U.S. at 581 (concurring opinion).

53 Id. In Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 750 (1965), dissenting to a denial of certiorari. Justice Black reaffirmed this position. The Mississippi statute made it unlawful "for any person, singly or in concert with others, to engage in picketing or mass
demonstrations ... so as to obstruct or interfere with free use of public streets, sidewalks or other public ways adjacent or contiguous thereto." Such a statute, Justice
Black argued, is not "overly broad in what it covers," nor does it "even undertake
to forbid or regulate picketing or demonstrating on the streets (as I think it could
- see Cox v. Louisiana . .
4 379 U.S. at 555.
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protection by the First Amendment. That assembly, particularly
when it focuses on affairs of government, as Stewart recognized in
Edwards, embodies values peculiar to itself: "[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places are an
important facility for public discussion and political process. They
are . . . a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities are made available is
an index of freedom." 5 5 Black, of all people, blinded by his formal
distinctions, refuses to recognize these values:
The First and Fourteenth Amendment, I think, take away from
government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of
speech, press, and assembly, where people have a right to be
for such purposes. This does not mean, however, that these Amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of
picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on
privately owned property. . . . Were the law otherwise, people on
the streets, in their homes and anywhere else could be compelled to
listen against their will to speakers they did not want to hear. 56

This is appalling. People moving through public settings do not
become a captive audience. Freedom of assembly assumes a place
to assemble; a guaranteed right of public assembly becomes hollow
when groups can be excluded from public open spaces. The State,
under the very terms of the First Amendment, simply does not have

that power. Its efforts, under these same terms ("the right of the
people peaceably to assemble"), must be limited to those which
promote peaceful assembly. Here, in this limited context, regulations of demonstrations have their place. 7
5 Kalven, The Concept of the PublicForum, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11-12.

56 379 U.S. at 578 '(concurring opinion).
5
7 We have, in moving from Feiner to a discussion of Edwards and Cox, ignored three
cases that are, conceptually, relevant to the demonstration problem: Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Garner v.

Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). All involved breach of peace convictions, but convictions based solely on evidence that the defendants had violated local segregation
customs. In Garner, seven students took seats at a lunch counter in Kress' Department Store in Baton Rouge. In Taylor, six Negroes went into the white waiting room
at a Shreveport bus depot. The Supreme Court, relying on Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), simply found no evidence to support the convictions. In Wright the defendants played basketball in a public park in Savannah. Here
the Supreme Court, relying on the equal protection clause, found, in the ouster of the
Negroes from the park, clear evidence of discriminatory enforcement.
But Garner did force a lengthy concurrence from Justice Harlan who, finding
that the owner of the store had consented to the presence of the Negroes, treated
their sit-in as a form of demonstration within the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment:
Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases, is as much a
part of the "free trade in ideas" as is verbal expression, more commonly
thought of as -speech." It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to "the
power of reason as applied through public discussion," .. . just as much as,
if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street
corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak. . . to mere verbal
expression.
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (concurring opinion).
This, of course, is the very analysis that was adopted, with such mischief, by
Stewart in Edwards and by Goldberg and Black in Cox.
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Justice Black's extreme position, conditioned in part by his
speech-conduct distinction, also can be explained by his narrow view
of the use of streets, and, no doubt, of other public facilities. Discussing the unconstitutional vagueness of the breach of peace statute
in Cox, he notes that the statute "neither forbids all crowds to congregate and picket on streets, nor is it narrowly drawn to prohibit
congregating or patrolling under certain clearly defined conditions
while preserving the freedom to speak of those who are using the
streets in the ordinary way that the State permits.''58 Black's concern
is with the ordinary way - foot and motor travel. The freedom to
speak of those involved in such uses must not be unduly curtailed.
If the State passed a law regulating such use, and "if such a law had
the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of speech, press, or
religion, it would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it
appeared that the State's interest in suppressing the conduct was not
sufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in engaging in conduct closely involving his First Amendment freedoms.'"'" For example, as Justice Black explains in his dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States,"0 the need to ccntrol the streets in Cantwell
could not justify the restriction made on speech. Where a man had
a right to be on a street, "he had a right peacefully to impart his
views to others."" But Cantwell, of course, was the isolated figure
on the street, who talked only as he walked. His speech was pure;
his conduct was conventional. But when Cantwell becomes a group,
speech, in Black's view, becomes inextricably involved with conduct,
and that conduct involves an extraordinary and inferior use of the
streets. Again, Black refuses to recognize the implications of the
right to free assembly. Assessing in Cox the impact of a plausibly
constitutional breach of peace statute aimed at patrolling and marching, he even drops the right from the familiar recital, asking only
"if such a law had the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of
speech, press, or religion.'' " Perhaps he senses that such a law would
directly impinge on the right of free assembly. However, given his
commitment to the ordinary uses of the streets, a commitment not
present in Feiner, he is almost compelled to ignore that possibility.
In Brown v. Louisiana" the question of ordinary use becomes
central because the demonstration has moved from a public open
space, the site of most protest gatherings, into a public library that
cannot, if it is to function as a library, accommodate such gatherings.
5 379 U.S. at 577 (concurring opinion).
59
60

Id.

360 U.S. 109 (1959).
61 310 U.S. at 308.
62 379 U.S. at 577 (concurring opinion).
61383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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Five young Negroes, angered by the segregation practices of the
Clinton, Louisiana, library, walked into its adult reading room,
where they were met by the assistant librarian. The petitioner Brown
requested a book. The librarian, checking the card catalogue, found
that the library did not have it. She told the Negroes so, and expected them to leave. But they remained. She then asked them to
leave, but petitioner Brown simply sat down and the others stood
near him saying nothing. The sheriff was not called, but within ten
or fifteen minutes after the Negroes arrived at the library, the sheriff
and deputies arrived. The sheriff asked the Negroes to leave. They
said they would not. He then arrested them on charges of breach
of the peace.
Justice Fortas recognizes at once that these Negroes were in the
library to protest its segregation. Then, having accepted the fact of
protest, he turns to the First Amendment:
As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights are not confined
to verbal expression.

They embrace appropriate types of action

which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner
to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the
protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional
segregation of
64
public facilities. [Footnotes omitted.]

This statement, taken alone, seems to ignore much complexity. The
defendants clearly had a right to use the library as a library. Their
presence, for that purpose, could not be contested. But they used
the library as a forum for their protest, and a library, unlike a street,
cannot, ordinarily, accommodate such uses. Justice White, concurring, was troubled by this problem, but he voted for reversal because "the behavior of these petitioners and their use of the library
building, even though it was for the purpose of a demonstration, did
not depart significantly from what normal library use would con'
template." 65
Under this view there was, in reality, no conflict of
uses, a fact that Justice Fortas finds crucial for his holding:
Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no claim can be
made that use of the library by others was disturbed by the demon-

stration. . . .Were it otherwise, a factor not present in this case
would have to be considered. Here, there was no disturbance of

others, no disruption of library activities, and no violation of any
library regulations. 66

This is an immense qualification, and it assumes even greater proportions when juxtaposed with a footnote Justice Fortas includes at the
beginning of his opinion:
Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place are not
chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the
65
66

Id. at 141-42.

d. at 151 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 142.
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constitutionally protected demonstration
itself, that their critics
87
might react with disorder or violence.

This is the most unequivocal statement yet made by a majority of
the Supreme Court on the relevance of the hostile crowd. Their disorder simply cannot be charged to a peaceful demonstration. But
does this principle apply when the public open space becomes a
public building, such as a library? Apparently not, for Justice Fortas
indicated that the disturbance of others might have deprived the
library demonstration of its protected character. Certainly, on a street,
disturbing others would not have that impact. Admittedly, Justice
Fortas, in the two quoted statements, was not speaking of identical
problems. In the library, others would be disturbed because they
were frustrated in their attempts to use the library as a library. In
public open spaces, such as a street, they might be disturbed simply
because they dislike what they see and hear. The former reaction is
legitimate, the latter, the hostile crowd, is not. But even on a street
people might be disturbed because demonstrators prevent them from
using the streets as they choose, perhaps for movement or play.
Should these uses prevail, or should the street be susceptible to many
uses? If Justice Fortas' footnote is read broadly, the answer is clearly
the latter.
Justice Black, of course, is furious, and he writes his dissent with
scant recognition of the narrow scope of the Fortas opinion. He
insists that Fortas has not focused on the unique character of a library:
The problems of state regulation of the streets on the one hand,
and public buildings on the other, are quite obviously separate and
distinct. Public buildings such as libraries, school houses, fire departments, courthouses, and executive mansions are maintained to perform certain specific and vital functions. Order and tranquility of
a sort entirely unknown to the public streets are essential to their
normal operation. . . . It is incomprehensible to me that a state
must measure disturbances in its libraries and on the streets with
68
identical standards.
This attack is unjustified, but the emphasis on the specific function
of public buildings is cogent. Black strongly intimates, however, that
this reasoning is not applicable to the streets, the site of most public
assemblies. Is he relenting, adopting a more comprehensive view of

the legitimate uses of public open spaces? Justice Black, as if in
answer, sounds a warning:
It is high time to challenge the assumption in which too many people

have too long acquiesced, that groups that think they have been
mistreated or that have actually been mistreated have a constitutional
right to use the public's streets, buildings, and property to protest
71Id. at 133 n.1.
6Id.

at 157 (dissenting opinion).
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whatever, wherever, whenever they want, without regard to whom

69
it may disturb.
Justice Black soon made this warning good.
In Adderley v. Florida70 two hundred Negro students from
Florida A & M University in Tallahassee marched from the school
grounds to the county jail, determined to protest the arrests of other
protesting students the day before, and to protest more generally
against state and local policies of racial segregation, including segregation of the jail. The students went directly to the door of the jail,
where they were met by a deputy sheriff who asked them to move
back, claiming that they were blocking the entrance to the jail. They
moved back part of the way, onto the jail driveway and an adjacent
grassy area on the jail premises, where they stood or sat, singing,
clapping, and dancing. Even after their partial retreat, however, the
demonstrators continued to block vehicular passage over the driveway, which was normally used by the sheriff's department for transporting prisoners to and from the courts several blocks away, and by
commercial concerns for servicing the jail. The sheriff finally told
them they were trespassing upon jail property, giving them 10 minutes
to leave. But the demonstrators did not move. After 10 minutes the
sheriff again announced that he was the legal custodian of the jail
and its premises, that they were trespassing on county property in
violation of the law, and that they should all leave forthwith or he
would arrest them. Some of the group then left. Others, including
the petitioners, did not. They were arrested on a charge of "trespass
with a malicious and mischievous intent" upon the premises of the
county jail, contrary to Section 821.18 of the Florida statutes: "Every
trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious
and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially
provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three
months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars."'"
Justice Black, writing for a majority that affirms the convictions, begins by distinguishing Edwards: "Traditionally, state capitol
grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes,
are not.''72 He then goes on to reduce Edwards and Cox to mere
holdings of statutory vagueness, arguing that the convictions in those
cases were vulnerable because South Carolina and Louisiana had
proceeded under statutes "so broad and all-embracing as to jeopardize speech, press, assembly and petition, under the constitutional

doctrine enunciated in Cantwell v. Connecticut ....
69

Id. at 162 (dissenting opinion).

70 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
71

FLA.STAT. ANN.§ 821.18 (1965).

72 385
73

U.S. at 41.

Id. at 42.
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trespass statute, however, cannot be so challenged: "Itis aimed at
conduct of one limited kind, that is, for one person or persons to
trespass upon the property of another with a malicious and mischievous intent. There is no lack of notice in this law, nothing to
entrap or fool the unwary."7 " Finally, Justice Black turns to the
fundamental question -whether
the State, by this narrow statute,
has the power to force these demonstrators "from what amounted
to the curtilage of the jailhouse." 75 The Justice has a ready answer,
drawn from his efforts in Cox and Brown:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the
property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this "area
chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only
reasonable but also particularly appropriate .. " Such an argument
has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people
who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional
right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.
That concept of constitutional law was . . . rejected in Cox v.
Louisiana. We reject it again. The United States Constitution does
not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own
lawful nondiscriminatory purpose. 6

There is a troubling ambiguity in this opinion. In Cox, Justice
Black said the State could ban picketing on its streets and highways.
In Brown, he said the State could ban assembly to protect the specific and vital function of a public building. Both thoughts seem
to be present here, perhaps because the site of the demonstration is
itself ambiguous. Justice Black speaks of premises, which could
mean a piece of land or a building, and "what amounted to the
curtilage of the jailhouse,"7 7 which suggests a yard within a wall.
He intimates that security was threatened, and that a driveway used
for commercial and jail purposes was blocked. These descriptions
and facts are tied to the "specific and vital function ' 78 theory. In
reality, however, the demonstrators seem to have been on an open
grassy area adjacent to the jail, barely related, if at all, to any specific jail function. Thus Justice Black uses the broad language of
prohibition: "The United States Constitution does not forbid a State
to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.""
Justice Douglas, angered by both theories, composes a dissent
that, at long last, fulfills the promise of Edwards and subjects these
74Id.

7Id.at 47.
76Id. at 47-48.
77 Id.at 47.
78
Id.at 45.
79

Id.at 48.
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demonstrations to a proper analysis. He begins by recognizing that
they are not problems of free speech. Rather, they implicate "the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."8 ° These rights protect a distinctive appeal to government: "Those who do not control television
and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or
circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of
access to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned
as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and
petition are peaceable, as these were.''81 Turning to Justice Black's
contention that the functioning of the jail was impaired, Justice
Douglas disputes him on the facts: "The evidence is uncontradicted
that the petitioners' conduct did not upset the jailhouse routine;
things went on as they normally would. ' 8 2 But he makes a further
point, one that assumes some interference: "If there was congestion,
the solution was a further request to move to lawns or parking areas,
not complete ejection and arrest.''8 The conflicting uses, properly
handled, could be accommodated. Justice Black had made a similar
point in Feiner,arguing that the police, rather than silencing Feiner,
should have attempted to clear a path for pedestrians. Justice Douglas
concedes, however, that there may be instances where accommodation is impossible: "There may be some public places which are so
clearly committed to other purposes that their use for the airing of
grievances is anomalous. . . .No one, for example, would suggest
that the Senate gallery is the proper place for a vociferous protest
rally. . . . But this is quite different from saying that all public places
are off limits to people with grievances.''4 Knowing that Justice
Black would give this power to the state, Justice Douglas returns to
the fundamental assertion of Hague v. C.I.O.:85
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must
not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.86
385 U.S. at 48 (dissenting opinion).
d. at 50-51.
82
d. at 51.
83
1d. at 52.
84
1d. at 54.
80
81

85 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
86id. at 515-16.
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Edwards and Cox, despite their confused analysis of demonstrations,
and despite Justice Black's effort to reduce their import, were decided in the tradition of Hague. Justice Douglas sees, in the majority's position, a sad fall from that tradition: "When we allow
Florida to construe her 'malicious trespass' statute to bar a person
that
from going on property knowing it is not his own and to apply
' 7
prohibition to public property, we discard Cox and Edwards.
IV.
Lt. Fend's confusion over the precise import of Adderley is understandable. The case aptly climaxes an ambiguous line of cases. But
if Lt. Fend were asked to study these cases, he might, despite some
bewilderment, come away convinced that he and his men had acted
legally on July 4th. The conclusion would not be untenable. Looking to the language of Justice Roberts in Cantwell, and to Justice
Black's repeated emphasis on the proper uses of streets and sidewalks, he might argue that the CDU, by imposing the area regulations, had acted to protect these uses. Looking to the language of
Justices Goldberg and Black in Cox, he might argue that the Court
has characterized these demonstrations as conduct, not speech, and
that the power of the state to regulate conduct is unquestioned.
Finally, surveying the complete line of cases from Cantwell to Adderley, he might argue that all of them involved instances of state termination of individual speech or group demonstration, and that, most
notably in Feiner, the propriety of this termination in critical circumstances was recognized. The CDU, at least initially, did not even
attempt to terminate a demonstration. It sought only to impose
limited area regulations on a large demonstration which, if unregulated, posed a serious threat of disorder. Surely, Lt. Fencl might
argue, the police have the power to do this much. Again, the claim
seems plausible. But the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court which
heard these arguments, in reviewing the convictions of the demonstrators, left the issue hopelessly confused.
The court dismissed the appeals of seven of the convicted demonstrators, explaining their culpable conduct in these terms:
Defendants by sitting down and refusing to remove themselves from
the area in question after being requested to do so by the police provoked interference with pedestrian traffic and hostile reaction by
the public which gave rise to serious disorder that threatened to get
out of hand. Their actions fully warrant their conviction of disorderly conduct. 88

This holding was no surprise. Throughout the trial de novo, as each
of the demonstrators took the stand, the judge carefully established,
87 385 U.S. at 53 (dissenting opinion).
88 Commonwealth v. Brand, Docket Nos. 1286 et seq. at 10-11 (Phil. County C.P. No.
2, Pa., Dec. 5, 1966).
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through his own questions, which of the demonstrators, after being
ordered by the police back to the north side of Chestnut Street, simply
sat down. Thus he prepared a record that would allow him to make
a narrow, conventional decision. This effort becomes clear when
he responds to the defendants' contention that the police order
was illegal:
It is no defense that these defendants may have believed that the

police were acting illegally, nor can we accept their contention that
their actions were a proper protest to this alleged illegality. There
are proper methods by which to voice an objection to police action
and disobedience of a police order under the circumstances in this
case was not the proper method by which to voice one's objection."s
The judge's statement, on its face, is ambiguous, but he must mean
that disobedience of a police order which takes the form of sitting
on a crowded sidewalk cannot be tolerated. This assertion does not
shock, nor does it illuminate the unique feature of the case. By finding culpable conduct only in those moments following the order to
return to the designated area, the judge fails to assess the significance
of the area restrictions and the propriety of the conduct that forced
the order to return. He simply states that those demonstrators who
did not sit down, in response to the order, were not disorderly:
[T]hese defendants were advised that they were under arrest prior
to the time when their activities might have resulted in disruption
of the orderly flow of pedestrian traffic. The distribution of leaflets
by these defendants did not constitute disorderly conduct.90
The judge must be saying that the police had no authority to order
the demonstrators to return to the designated area, which further
implies that they had no authority to confine the demonstrators at
all. He even seems to be transforming the demonstration into instances of isolated leafleting, which has long been .protected as an
important form of free speech. But, at the end of his opinion, the
judge re-recognizes the fact of a demonstration, and, in a strange
exercise in irrelevance, he congratulates the police on a job well-done:
We believe the police exercised their discretion properly in restricting each of these groups to a particular area in close proximity to
the ceremonies which were taking place so that no disturbance
would occur and pedestrian traffic would flow in an orderly fashion.
In short, we believe the police must have some discretionary authority to impose narrow regulations on large demonstrations which,
if not regulated, pose serious threats of disorder.9 1
Poor Lt. Fencl. First the judge says he and his men could not confine.
Then he says they used their authority properly. And, even worse,
if Lt. Fencl does gain some comfort from the judge's grant of au89

Id. at 11.
90 id. at 8.
91 ld. at 14.
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thority, he would have to be told, by those wise in the law, that the
judge's statement was a frail dictum.
But this statement, however much a gratuity in the Philadelphia
court's opinion, contains wisdom that cannot be dismissed. The
police must have the authority that the court calls for, and all those
demonstrators who ignored that authority should have been guilty
of disorderly conduct. This assertion does not deny the crucial value
of that demonstration, nor does it imply approval of severe curtailment. Rather, it looks to Kalven's concept of the public forum, and
the rules needed to order that forum: "[W]hat is required is in
effect a set of Robert's Rules of Order for the new uses of the public forum, albeit the designing of such rules poses a problem of
formidable practical difficulty.''92 The area restriction was such a
rule, and its imposition by the police reflected, in reality, respect for
the stature of demonstrations. Under the view of Justice Black, who
would devote public open spaces to traffic flow or other ordinary
uses, the police, assuming they acted without discrimination, pursuant
perhaps to an obstructing the sidewalk statute, could have terminated
the demonstration. The Civil Disobedience Unit, however, rejects
this limited view of public open spaces, choosing instead Kalven's
concept of the public forum. The choice, of course, makes the police
task more difficult. Elimination of some conflicting uses would be
easier than accommodation. But the choice is really not a choice at
all. It is, under a proper view of the First Amendment, a constitutionally compelled decision.
The key is "the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
Justice Stewart suspected this truth in Edwards. Justice Douglas affirmed it in dissent in Adderley. Today's demonstrations, like the
one at Independence Hall, must be recognized as the modern form
of public assembly, protected, like free speech and press, by the First
Amendment. This assertion, admittedly, is not inevitable, and those
who look to original meaning might argue that the assembly known
to that early Congress was not the assembly of public protest.
Constitutional history, if one looks for certainty, is inconclusive.
But the right of assembly, when it was proposed for inclusion in the
Bill of Rights, provoked an intriguing debate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts moved to strike the right,
arguing that the free speech guarantee implied the right to assemble:
If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that
purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people
possess; it is certainly a thing that would never be called in question; it is93derogatory to the dignity of the House to descend to such
minutiae.

Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT.REV. 1, 12.
93Jarrett & Mlund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1,35 (1931).
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Mr. Tucker, however, did not find the right redundant, and he hoped
that the words would not be struck out. Moreover, he urged the
inclusion of a declaration, recommended by the states of Virginia
and North Carolina, that the people should have a right to instruct
their representatives, a suggestion which soon became the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. To Tucker, this
right to instruct, or petition, was the most material part of the Virginia and North Carolina recommendation, which had included both
the right to assemble and petition. 4
This emphasis is suggestive. Sedgwick saw assembly as no more
than the inevitable gathering of people who are free to speak. But
Tucker saw assembly as a gathering that serves its highest function
when it challenges government. Without this ultimate right to petition, the assembly becomes mere gesture, devoid of impact. Indeed,
since the days of Magna Charta, these two rights, of assembly and
petition, have always been tied together. But, as originally conceived, these rights involved distinct moments in time. The lords
assembled and then, having reached agreement, presented their grievances to the king. Tucker and his contemporaries undoubtedly saw
assembly and petition as distinct acts, and the Supreme Court in
De Jonge v. Oregon,9 5 reflected this understanding. Holding that
De Jonge's mere assistance at a meeting called by the Communist
Party could not be punished under a criminal syndicalism statute, the
Court affirmed the basic import of free assembly:
The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free
speech and free press and is equally fundamental. As this court said
in United States v. Cruikshank ... : "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and
to petition for a redress of grievances." 9 6

Here again, the people first meet, and then, having consulted, they
frame a reasoned appeal to their government. If there is to be protest, the appeal will state it. But the assembly itself is only a quiet
prelude.
Today's demonstrations, however, are not quiet preludes, and
thus they do not conform to the ancient scheme perceived by Tucker
and the Court in De Jonge. These demonstrations are, in themselves,
acts of protest, immediate and provocative. They do not rely, for
their impact, on any subsequent written appeal. Noting this difference, those intent on ancient practice could make the argument, suggested earlier, that these demonstrations cannot be defended as protected public assemblies. But this argument would be sadly formal.
94 Id.
95

299 U.S. 353 (1937).
9 Id. at 364.
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Public assembly was crucial because, as Tucker suggested, it promoted the more fundamental goal of petitioning the government,
an act subsequent in time. Now, however, in the modern demonstration, the acts of assembly and petition occur simultaneously. But
if the value of effective petition remains compelling, and it must,
the fact of assembly, now, as then, must be protected. Thus Justice
Douglas, in his dissent in Adderley, continually emphasizes the relationship between the act of assembly and the effectiveness of petition.
Justice Douglas knew that the demonstrators were expressing much
of their protest through the fact of assembly at the site of grievances,
but he was untroubled by the spectacle: "The right to petition for
the redress of grievances ... is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman .... "" The more dramatic petition,
achieved by public assembly, must also be protected.
This argument has large implications. In Williams v. Wallace9 8
the petitioners asked the district court to protect, through an injunction requiring adequate police protection, their right to assemble and
demonstrate peaceably against the continuing denial of their right
to vote. The demonstration would be unique - a march, involving
hundreds of people, alongside U.S. Highway 80 from Selma, Alabama, to Montgomery, the state capital. Though disruption of highway traffic was assured, the district judge, announcing a new doctrine, issued the injunction: "[T]he extent of the right to assemble,
demonstrate, and march peaceably along the highways and streets in
an orderly manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the
wrongs that are being protested and petitioned against. ' This doctrine has disarming appeal, particularly because it is so appropriate
to the Selma case. The wrongs there were enormous. But, on any
realistic view, the doctrine is untenable, involving the courts in even
greater imponderables than a clear and present danger test. However, this doctrine, whatever its inadequacies, would never have been
formulated if the court had not, at the outset, recognized the true
import of the proposed demonstration:
The attempted march alongside U.S. Highway 80 [this earlier march
had been brutally blocked by Alabama officials] . . . involved
nothing more than a peaceful effort on the part of Negro citizens
to exercise a classic constitutional right; that is, the right to assemble peaceably and to petition one's government for the redress of
grievances. 100
The court, untroubled by the unique form of this assembly, then
states a crucial link between assembly and petition:
"

- 385 U.S. at 49-50 (dissenting opinion).
98 240 F. Supp. 100 (1965).
99

1 d. at 106.

1Old. at 105.
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The law is clear that the right to petition one's government for the
redress of grievances may be exercised in large groups. Indeed,
where, as here, minorities have been harassed, coerced and intimidated, group association may be the only realistic way of exercising

such rights. 1°1
At Selma the need for group protest was obvious. But, even in less
threatening settings, only the solidarity of a group will encourage
individuals to protest publicly on controversial issues. Deprive them
of that solidarity and they will be mute.
The district judge in Williams recognized, of course, that the
rights of assembly and petition which his injunction protected had
to be reconciled, as far as possible, with the prevailing use of the
highway. In part, he approached this problem by announcing his
equivalence theory - large wrong means large right of protest, which
here meant the extraordinary right to use an interstate highway as
a forum for protest. But he also approached the problem more
subtly. The Selma to Montgomery highway, according to the law
of Alabama, was open to pedestrian traffic. Thus, reasoned the
judge, "a reasonable use of the highways for the purpose of pedestrian marching is guaranteed ...by the Constitution of the United

States according to the principles above set out [referring to right
of assembly and petition] .. 102 The thrust of this argument is not
completely clear. But apparently the district judge, unlike Justice
Black, believes that any public way which is open to pedestrian
traffic must accommodate more uses than simple walking. If these
pedestrians want to become a group, using the public way as a forum
for their protest, they have a constitutional right to do so, subject
only to requirements of reconciliation with more conventional uses.
Thus the judge, searching for this reconciliation, carefully scrutinized
the detailed plans for the march. True, this argument of pedestrian
use seems, in the context of this case, a make-weight, and the case
itself is so extraordinary that any reliance on it in actual litigation
will be risky. But the case, by its very uniqueness, reveals the dramatic potency of these neglected rights of assembly and petition.
The court, if it had taken a more restricted view of those rights,
would have dismissed the Selma March as an outrageous intrusion
on the public convenience.
The Supreme Court, apart from Justice Douglas and his dissenting colleagues, is not yet so enlightened. Its refusal to recognize
the Edwards, Cox, and Adderley demonstrations as instances of protected public assembly has led to the inept speech, speech-plus analysis,
with its implication that demonstrations, speech-plus, can be severely
regulated, even banned. Such analysis simply ignores the rights of
101Id. at 106.
02
1 Id.at 107.
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assembly and petition, permitting the Court to treat a case of public
assembly "as if it were an ordinary trespass case or an ordinary
picketing case. 10 3 The July 4th demonstrators, though involved
in a much more modest effort than their Selma counterparts, were
also exercising a fundamental right of public assembly which cannot
be so reduced in stature. But that right, however fundamental, is a
"right of the people peaceably to assemble." The "peaceably" qualification imports the limitations on the right which legitimize police
efforts to regu!ate the demonstration. These efforts, at Independence
Hall, were designed to accommodate potentially conflicting uses,
and to prevent conflict with people and groups antagonistic to the
demonstrators. Given this purpose and impact, the CDU's area regulation was constitutionally unobjectionable, a proper exercise of
police discretion.
But the police must move cautiously. Their regulations could,
if uncontrolled, undermine the value of demonstrations. The courts
must involve themselves in the difficult task of reviewing the exercise of police discretion, assessing its impact on the demonstration
in question. For example, at the July 4th demonstration, the limited
area regulation, imposed so near to Independence Hall, did not deprive the demonstration of its ironic comment or its challenge to the
speech of George Ball. It did not limit the size of the demonstration.
Except for the south side of Chestnut Street in front of Independence
Hall, the demonstrators were free to carry their signs and distribute
their leaflets wherever they chose. They did, in fact, distribute leaflets at several points near the prohibited area, and, had they so chosen,
they could have reached most of those people they cared to reach.
They remained visible and provocative.
However, any effort to legitimize the area regulation as a simple
attempt at accommodation of conflicting uses would be disingenuous.
The regulation was designed, in substantial part, to protect the
demonstrators from hostile crowds who, in their defiant reaction to
the demonstrators, were themselves involved in no legitimate use of
the streets. Justice Jackson, of course, would approve of this regulation. The provocative demonstrators must, in his view, submit to
controls as the price of their need for protection, a troubling position
because of the implications of its logic. But, as usual, there was
wisdom in this candid argument. Demonstrations do derive some
value from the intense reactions they force. They are designed to
upset people. Public assembly, by its very nature, is provocative.
The police, knowing this, prepare for hostility, just as they prepare
for the people who simply want to walk freely along the street or
into Independence Square. These preparations for the conflicting
103

385 U.S. at 49 (dissenting opinion).
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uses can also provide simultaneous protection against the hostile
crowd. So construed, these preparations seem legitimate, conditioned
by proper considerations. The area regulation on July 4th was, in
large measure, so conditioned. However, the impact of the hostile
crowd on this regulation was real. Absent that crowd, the area regulation, conditioned only by a concern for traffic flow, might not have
been so stringent. Thus the inquiry must turn to the impact of the
regulation on the effect of the demonstration. If the hostile crowd
forces a regulation that undermines the value of the assembly, then
the regulation is improper. If, however, that crowd forces a regulation which, on a realistic appraisal, does not vitiate the impact of the
assembly, then the regulation is proper. Such was the area regulation
imposed on July 4th at Independence Hall.
All this, of course, is speculation, grounded in beliefs of what
the law should be. The Supreme Court, in cases like Edwards, Cox,
and Adderley, has simply not encountered the sophisticated control
techniques used by Philadelphia's Civil Disobedience Unit. However, the Court recently confronted a case, Turner v. New York, 04
which, while it involved no sophisticated control techniques, offered
the court an opportunity to clarify the importance of area restrictions, and, more fundamentally, to reappraise the constitutional
stature of demonstrations. Unfortunately, over the objections of
Justices Douglas and Fortas, the Court, having earlier granted certiorari, dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. But the Turner
case, in its progress through the lower courts, and, ultimately, in its
cautious dismissal by the Supreme Court, illuminates the confused
state of the law of demonstrations. It merits the hard look the
Supreme Court refused to give it. Turner involved a demonstration
by the May 2nd movement, an anti-Viet Nam war group formed at
Yale, held about 4:00 on a Saturday afternoon in Duffy Square,
a triangular area in midtown Manhattan, extending from 46th to
47th Streets. The speakers at the meeting stood on the steps leading to a statue of Father Duffy towards the northern end of the
Square, with the audience of 60 to 200 people in the center section.
The police, at a subsequent trial on disorderly conduct charges,
claimed that the meeting forced pedestrians into the street, which
further disrupted motor traffic. Seeing this disruption, a police
captain ordered the speakers to disperse the assembly, but they refused. The police captain withdrew, then returned a few moments
later with another order to disperse, which again was ignored. Soon
two policemen on horseback rode into the center of the Square
1°448 Misc. 2d 611, 265 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 1965), affd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 829,
271 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966), remittitur amended, 18 N.Y.2d 683, 273 N.Y.S.2d 431
(1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 917 (1967), writ dismissed, mem., 87 S. Ct. 1417
(1967).
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where the audience was standing, accompanied by approximately
a dozen foot patrolmen. This forceful intrusion quickly broke up
the meeting, but most of the petitioners, members of the May 2nd
group, tried to avoid the horses and to continue the meeting for
some minutes, until the police stated they were under arrest. Then
they quickly submitted. Most of the prosecution's evidence, as the
petitioners emphasize in their brief, and as is apparent in the opinion
of the Appellate Term, concerned acts of individual petitioners in
the period between the move of the horses into the Square and petitioners' arrests. Nine of the prosecution's eleven witnesses were
policemen who had come to the Square only at the time of the dispersal order. While the policemen described petitioners as running
around in the Square and screaming, their screaming consisted mainly
of calls to each other, condemnation of the police as "fascist cops,"
and claims of their right to assemble.
This demonstration, similar, in some respects, to the July 4th
demonstration, raises troublesome issues. People have gathered in
a public square, in the midst of a busy metropolitan area, to both
protest and listen to a protest against government action. The assembly represents, in reality, a hybrid of Feiner and Cox, for it involves both the demonstrators, who here rely heavily on speeches,
and those who have come to listen to them. Justice Black, depending
on his predilection, could have found either pure speech or speechplus in this setting. Then, having so found, he could have found
for freedom or restriction. The distinction, however, is again absurd.
Feiner, properly viewed, involved the same control problems as
Edwards and Cox, most notably, the impact of the gathering on
normal street uses. Here, in Duffy Square, that impact again is
central. In the judgment of the police, the assembly became unlawful as soon as it obstructed pedestrians and vehicles, and their order
to disperse was so premised. This judgment recalls July 4th,
principally because it reflects a radically different police approach.
The Civil Disobedience Unit, as it often does, allowed the anti-war
demonstration to obstruct, within limits, the flow of pedestrians and
vehicles. When those limits, represented by the area restrictions,
were exceeded, the police, rather than ordering immediate termination of the demonstration, ordered the demonstrators to return to
the designated area. The New York police allowed no obstruction,
ordering immediate dispersal. Setting alone does not explain the
different approach. Duffy Square is several blocks north of Times
Square. The meeting was not in the middle of the street, nor did it
occur during the rush hour. Accommodation of competing uses
would have been no more difficult than it was at Independence Hall.
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The defendants, of course, as did the defendants at Independence Hall, deny that there was any need for police intrusion. On
July 4th, the demonstrators argue, there was, despite the testimony of the police, no threat of violence and no obstruction. At
Duffy Square, the demonstrators argue, there was no significant
obstruction until the police injected themselves. Both contend that
the police had no authority to give their respective orders - one to
return to a confined area, the other to disperse. In the Philadelphia
case, the trial judge left this issue of police authority hopelessly
muddled, though he made it clear that, in sustaining some of the
disorderly conduct charges, he was focusing on the defiant response
of some demonstrators to the order, legal or illegal, to return across
the street. In the New York case, however, the complaint against
petitioners specifically focused on conduct prior to the dispersal
order, charging them with conducting an unlawful meeting - unlawful because they obstructed traffic, caused a crowd to collect, and
used boisterous language. But at trial the state based its prosecution
on the conduct of the demonstrators after the order to disperse, and
the trial judge made no effort to limit the evidence to the acts specifically charged in the complaint. On appeal, the petitioners argued
that this failure allowed conviction on a charge not made, in violation of due process. A New York Supreme Court rejected the argument, indicating that "evidence of a violation of any subdivision of
section 722 of the Penal Law will support a conviction thereunder,
regardless of whether the complaint charges a defendant under one
particular subdivision or another."1 ' It added that "there is ample
[sic] in the wording of the complaint to justify sustaining the charges
by evidence of conduct after the order." 10 6 One judge, however,
accepted the petitioners' argument in dissent:
[TJhe evidence adduced on the trial was tangential, if not wholly

irrelevant, to the only issue which could be properly agitated under
the complaint, i.e.: the conduct of the defendants before police
intervention. We may not perpetuate its vice here. The complaint
was not adequate to sustain the charges upon which conviction was
105 48 Misc. 2d at 619, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The New York Disorderly Conduct Statute
reads, in relevant parts:
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a
breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts
shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct,
or be offensive to others;
3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on
when ordered by the police;
4. By his actions causes a crowd to collect, except when lawfully
addressing such a crowd ....
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722 (2)-(4).
106 48 Misc. 2d at 619, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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rendered by the trial court nor as the predicate
of the offenses now
07
pressed upon us to sustain that judgment.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court the petitioners continued to
press this argument, and Justice Douglas, in his dissent to the dismissal of certiorari, emphasized that a conviction upon a charge
not made is not consistent with due process. But if the Court had
seized only this issue as the ground for its decision, it would have
failed to clarify a vexing problem, found in Turner and in so many
demonstration cases - what can demonstrators do in response to a
police order they regard as illegal. Are they limited to stoic disobedience, or can they be more forceful? Most of the relevant law,
as the majority opinion in the New York court emphasizes, involves
responses to unlawful arrests, a distinction the New York court finds
crucial. It concedes that
[ain unlawful arrest would afford a defendant "the right to resist
and use 'force and violence' against the officer '. . . to prevent an
offense against his person' provided such 'force or violence used
[was] not more than sufficient to prevent such offense' .. . .
But this argument, it continues, "does not sanction the conduct set
forth here in defiance of a police order to disperse - not in defiance
of an unlawful arrest and, in fact, prior to any arrest."'0 ° The dissent, however, finds no force in this distinction, arguing that the
demonstrators, "[clonfronted with the police assault, . . . could
legally do what was reasonably necessary to resist the unlawful
aggression . . . .In this context, defendants were liable to criminal
sanctions only if they pursued a 'counterattack .. .merely for the
sake of revenge or the infliction of needless injury.' . . . The record
shows none ...."110 The dissent, in rejecting the distinction, is surely
right. The police have authority to order dispersal only because, at
that moment, they find unlawful conduct (assumed for the moment).
If they had cared to, they could have arrested. Using their discretion,
they simply chose another alternative - the order to disperse. Both
arrest and order imply the same judgment and finality. Admittedly,
some disorderly conduct statutes, such as subdivision three of the
New York statute, make disobedience of a police order an element
of the offense, but here too the refusal only becomes meaningful if
the order itself is lawful. Moreover, since the public assembly in
this case also violated subdivisions two and four of the New York
statute, the police, at the moment of their order, had the authority
to arrest, assuming, again, the illegality of the assembly. But it is
precisely over this point, the legality of the assembly, that the ma107Id.
108

at 632, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 621, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 851.

109 Id.
1

O ld.at 631-32, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 861 (dissenting opinion).
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jority and the dissenter contend most sharply. Finding the meeting
unlawful, the majority sees the irresponsible violation of a lawful
order, and thus demands well-mannered disobedience. The dissenter,
finding the meeting lawful, would allow the demonstrators to respond aggressively to the unlawful acts of the police. The Supreme
Court, had it confronted this conflict, might have found it impossible,
and profitless, to avoid the fundamental issue in the case - the
legality of the assembly in Duffy Square.
The majority's holding of illegal assembly does not rest on any
finding of actual disorderly conduct prior to the dispersal order.
Indeed, the majority emphatically states that "there is absolutely no
showing here that defendants caused any serious annoyance to pedestrians or that their manner was threatening or abusive." '' But the
court does find that the police had authority to anticipate disorder:
The police, in performing their duties, may give reasonable directions. Present at the point where the defendants were congregating
they might early sense the possibility of disorder. Even a protest
from pedestrians who were annoyed by the defendants' conduct
might be a significant element in determining whether persistence
in such conduct was wrongful. 112
This assertion is dubious law, both on the facts of this case and on
principle. The Supreme Court, had it taken the case, could have
involved itself in an independent examination of the whole record,"'
and, where the evidence of actual obstruction or disorder was nonexistent, it might well have been particularly reluctant to sanction
police orders premised on anticipated trouble. True, the Court has
never said that the police cannot act in anticipation, and, in Feiner,
Chief Justice Vinson explicitly said that the police are not powerless
to prevent a breach of the peace. But the anticipated breach in Feiner
was a riot, not simple obstruction of traffic. Moreover, in cases subsequent to Feiner, such as Edwards and Cox, the Court has shown
marked hostility to state claims that the police acted to prevent
trouble. Justice Stewart, in Edwards, emphasized that "police protection at the scene was at all times sufficient to meet any foreseeable
possibility of disorder." "14 In Cox, Justice Goldberg, also unhappy
with the presence of a hostile crowd, rejected the state's argument
that the breach of peace convictions should be sustained because of
police fears that violence was about to erupt: "[The] evidence showed
no more than that the opinions which [the students] were peaceably
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of
W-'Id. at 620, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
112 Id. at 624, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
113 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
114 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1963).
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the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection."" 5
Although both Justices Stewart and Goldberg were preoccupied with
the hostile crowd problem, Justice Stewart recognized that anticipated
disorder might include disruption of pedestrian and traffic movement. Here too, still speaking in Edwards, he saw no justification
for terminating the demonstration: "Although vehicular traffic at
a nearby street intersection was slowed down somewhat, an officer
was dispatched to keep traffic moving. There were a number of
bystanders on the public sidewalks adjacent to the State House
grounds, but they all moved on when asked to do so, and there was
no impediment of pedestrian traffic.""' 6 In effect, Justice Stewart,
though he speaks obliquely, argues that the police, finding a conflict
between the demonstration and other street uses, should have moved
to reconcile these uses. The petitioners, in their brief to the Supreme
Court, relied on this approach to defend the lawfulness of their
assembly:
Even if some demonstrators did overflow the Duffy Square area
itself [a fact the petitioners deny] the order to disperse was nevertheless unjustifiable. For if the police had really been concerned
with such inconsequential interference with traffic that could have
been averted by ordering a slight narrowing
of the gathering - and
7
that was not done. Cf. Edwards."

Similar arguments for accommodation were made by Justices Black
and Douglas in their dissenting opinions in Feiner and Adderley.
These arguments adopt, in reality, the approach of the Philadelphia
Civil Disobedience Unit which, with its area restriction, sought a
viable accommodation of uses. If the Supreme Court had adopted
petitioners' position, it would, in effect, have sanctioned area restrictions, at least where those restrictions were needed to achieve
accommodation.
The argument for accommodation, however, assumes that these
demonstrations have a claim, with pedestrians and traffic, to equal
use of public open spaces - a claim that is still uncertain. The majority of the New York court might have confronted this issue in
dealing with subdivision three of the New York disorderly conduct
statute, which makes it a crime to "congregate with others on a public street and refuse to move on when ordered by the police.""' 8
Although this statute, unlike the Louisiana obstructing public passages statute, requires an intent to breach the peace, or circumstances
that threaten breach, it does pose a similarly broad challenge to right

16Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1963).
236372 U.S. at 232.
"I Brief for Petitioners at 16, Turner v. New York, cert. granted, 385 U.S. 917, writ
dismissed, mem., 87 S. Ct. 1417 (1967).
12 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722 (3).
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of assembly. Groups will now be "entirely at the mercy of any police
officer."' "9 The New York court, however, like the Supreme Court
in Cox, prefers not to analyze the significance of these demonstrations that now strain familiar doctrines of free speech. Rather, in an
intriguing use of Supreme Court precedent, the New York court
finds that subdivision three is not unconstitutional on its face, and
that there is no hint of discriminatory enforcement.
Edwards offers the first point of analysis, and the New York
court quickly distinguishes it:
[T]he thrust of the Court's holding, under facts markedly dissimilar
from those with which we are confronted, was to vitiate a statute
which was aimed at and employed for the purpose of inhibiting, by
means of criminal sanction, "the peaceful expression of unpopular
views." We have no such case here. There is no claim, nor could
there be, that either the statute here involved or the police action
taken was120meant to restrict the expression of views, popular or unpopular.
There was, in fact, such a claim, and the petitioners continued to press
it in their brief to the Court: "One cannot read the record herein
without reaching the conclusion that the police order to disperse,
the arrests, and the prosecution were all motivated by hostility to
the unpopular views expressed at the meeting.' '121 The New York
court simply disagrees, finding it inconceivable that New York police
could be so motivated. Southern police, however, facing Negroes,
do act with malice - or so the New York court implies. Edwards
does permit this interpretation, particularly when Justice Stewart
writes that "[w~e do not review in this case criminal convictions
resulting from the evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly
drawn regulatory statute ..
12 The suggestion of vindicative enforcement is strong. Justice Black himself, in Adderley, said Edwards
was premised solely on the vagueness of South Carolina's breach of
peace statute - a holding that looks to the possibility of administrative abuse. But Justice Stewart also focused on the facts in Edwards,
writing that the demonstrators were "convicted upon evidence which
showed no rnore than that the opinions which they were peaceably
exp-essing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of
23
the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police actions."'
He strongly intimates that this conduct, absent a showing that it violated some narrowly drawn statute, could never be punished by the
state, principally because "[tihe circumstances in this case reflect an
exercise of these basic constitutional rights [speech, assembly, and
119 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 117, at 15.
12048

Misc. 2d 611, 626, 265 N.Y.S.2d 841, 856.

121 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 117, at 15.

12 372 U.S. at 236.
123 Id. at 237.
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petition] in their most pristine and classic form."1 2 4 But Justice
Stewart never assessed the implications of this "pristine and classic
form," contenting himself with a conventional free speech analysis
that wholly ignored the basic question of a constitutional right to
use public open spaces as a forum for protest. The New York court,
understandably, does no more.
Feiner is the next stop, and the New York court uses the case
joyfully. It involved the same disorderly conduct statute challenged
in this case. It involved claims of police censorship. But Chief
Justice Vinson, writing for a majority that was impressed by the
findings of the trial court, found the police action commendable.
The New York court quotes him at length:
"The officers in making the arrest were motivated solely by a proper
concern for the preservation of order and protection of the general
welfare, and . . . there was no evidence which could lend color to a
claim that the acts of the police were a cover for suppression of
petitioner's views and opinions. Petitioner was thus neither arrested

nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather,
it was the reaction which it actually engendered.- 12 5
But Feiner, on any honest view, is simply irrelevant. The trial court
had found an incipient riot, deliberately stirred by the speaker. The
Supreme Court accepted that finding, and, in that extreme situation,
permitted the police to silence the speaker. At Duffy Square there
was, at most, the danger of traffic obstruction. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court, in Feiner, did refer to disruptions of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, just as it referred to threats of violence
against the speaker. But both these elements are distinct from the
fundamental concern of the Court - the speaker who incites to riot.
Yet, by mindlessly including such elements in its recital of important
facts, the Supreme Court suggested the propriety of police termination of assemblies far less volatile than the one in Feiner. The New
York court accepted that suggestion.
Finally, the court turns to Cox, which gives it little trouble.
Noting the similarity between Louisiana's breach of peace statute,
declared unconstitutionally vague, and subdivision three of the New
York disorderly conduct statute, the court emphasizes that the
Louisiana statute was found unconstitutional as authoritatively interpreted. Breach of peace, said the Louisiana Supreme Court, meant
"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt,
to hinder, to disquiet." The Supreme Court objected - the definition
allowed punishment for peacefully expressing unpopular views. In
New York, however, breach of peace is defined as a "disturbance
of public order by any act of violence, or by any act likely to produce
1

2ld. at 235.

12548

Misc. 2d at 627, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
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violence, or which, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the
peace and quiet of the community. ' 1 26 The New York court finds
this definition far more specific, and thus outside the ban of Cox.
Similarly, when the court turns to the facts of the case, it also distinguishes Cox: "Clearly, the application of subdivision 3 to the
convictions here involved was not an attempt to suppress unpopular
views, but was aimed solely at the maintenance of order and the
avoidance of obstruction to vehicular and pedestrian traffic.''127
Again, as in Edwards, the New York court interprets a demonstration case as a slap at Southern law enforcement. Again, the Supreme
Court, when it analyzed the conduct in Cox, invited this interpretation. Although it praised the controlled behavior of the demonstrators, the Court issued stern warnings, couched in the speech, speechplus jargon, that the demonstrators were involved in conduct that
could not be granted the same protection as pure speech. In other
settings, less suspicious than the one in Baton Rouge, that conduct
might forego all protection - or so the opinion implied. The New
York court was guided by the implication.
CONCLUSION

The New York court's opinion in Turner was no surprise, despite the cries of the lone dissenter. He found wisdom in Cantwell:
Only "[w~hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate
threat to public safety, peace or order, appears," may the State interfere with a demonstration ....
No such conditions existed during
8
the instant demonstration.12
This assessment of the demonstration rings true, but the analysis is
no more satisfactory than the majority's. Clear and present danger
is an unworkable test, derived from free speech cases. Interference
with traffic is a puny value. The majority, though it never mentions
the clear and present danger test, could easily have used it to sustain
the convictions. This fact is symptomatic of the law throughout
this area.
The Supreme Court, beginning with Cantwell, has created precedents, heavily factual in their holdings, flawed by untenable distinctions, that can be used, in any situation, to justify any result. Such
ambivalence, of course, is not peculiar to this area of the law. And
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Feiner, is surely right when he
warns that "this court can only hope to set limits and point the
way. '12' But ambivalence over First Amendment rights is peculiarly
16
27

Id. at 620, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 849.

1 Id. at 629, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
In Id. at 631, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61 (dissenting opinion).
'2Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
Feiner and companion cases).
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dangerous, and the Court, confronted with new techniques of protest, has not even begun to "point the way." Until the Court frees
itself of the speech-plus analysis, and recognizes that demonstrations
at Independence Hall and Duffy Square are modern forms of public
assembly, entitled to generous use of public open spaces, these dramatic new forms of protest will often be suppressed by innately
hostile police who act, with ludicrous regularity, to preserve the
flow of traffic or protect a rigid order. These officials must be told
that cars and pedestrians are not sacred; that public disorder is not
intolerable; that public assembly, in modern dress, embodies values
that must be guarded. Such pronouncements, admittedly, would mark
only the beginning of sophistication. There would remain difficult
problems of reconciliation, resolved, hopefully, at the local level,
through permit systems and, as in Philadelphia, skilled police conduct.
But reconciliation efforts will rarely come, as Duffy Square reveals,
until the Court, with its moral force, gives these demonstrations
proper status. Justice Douglas, in Adderley, has already acted. His
brothers, faced with Turner, could have shared this wisdom.

